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Objectives of the Research
The objectives of the research are as follows: (1) to evaluate the degree of diversification of the 
Finnish and Israeli venture capital firms, (2) to identify the most important factors, which affect the 
degree of investment diversification, (3) to measure the extent of syndication among venture capital 
firms in Finland and in Israel, (4) to identify how technology affects diversification and syndication 
patterns, (5) to identify the most important reasons for the existence of syndication in Finland and in 
Israel, (6) to evaluate how syndication enables venture capital firms to diversify their portfolios 
across industries, venture stages, portfolio companies, and location, and (7) to identify how public 
funds affect venture capital markets.
Theory and Formation of the Hypotheses
The diversification-related hypotheses presented in the theory part of the study are based on 
Markowitz’s portfolio theory and on the information-gathering costs. The hypotheses regarding 
syndication are based on the Pfeffers’s and Salancik’s Resource Exchange Model.
Data and Methodology
The empirical data of the research consists of venture capital firms’ investment preferences as well as 
of their actual portfolio investments. The empirical analyses are based on statistical methods. In 
addition, a questionnaire was sent to venture capitalists in order to obtain information on the reasons 
for syndication.
Results of the Research
The results show that the Finnish venture capital firms (VCFs) are more industry-diversified than the 
Israeli VCFs. In addition, the Finnish VCFs are concentrating more on late stage low-tech ventures 
compared to Israeli VCFs. The Finnish early stage investors tend to be more industry-diversified than 
those focusing on later stage ventures. In Israel the opposite is true - the early stage VCFs are found 
to be less diversified across industries. The result suggests that the cost of gaining knowledge in high- 
tech industries is likely to be higher than in low-tech industries. Results from both sample countries 
are in conformity with previous results, which give support for the venture stage specialization 
hypothesis. The results suggest that the cost of simultaneously gaining knowledge and expertise in 
both early and late stage ventures is high.
According to a partial correlation analysis, industry and venture stage diversification would seem to 
act as substitutes for geographic scope. These results can be explained by the portfolio theory as well 
as by the VCF’s need to find a sufficient amount of prospective ventures.
The results are in conformity with previous research, where the degree of concentration and 
uncertainty were found to increase VCFs’ propensity to syndicate. The most important contribution of 
this research relates to the empirical finding of the positive relationship between the propensity to 
syndicate and the degree of diversification. Venture capitalists’ replies to the questionnaire further 
validate the empirical results. Hence, the results would seem to indicate that diversification is one of 
the most important reasons for VCFs to syndicate.
Finally, public funds in Finland seem to behave as expected. Public VCFs tend to invest in early high- 
tech ventures. Public VCFs are also found to be more locally-oriented than private VCFs.
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1.1. Background of the Study
Venture capital is created to fund small and medium sized firms with significant growth 
potential. Small and medium sized firms, in turn, are of vital importance for the economy. 
Finnish small and medium sized firms employ almost 60 percent of all business employees 
and the share is still expected to increase1. Thus, venture capital market has indirect but 
important implications to the unemployment rate in Finland. For example in Europe, the 
number of employees of both venture-backed companies and top European companies 
increased during 1991-1995 by 15 and 2 percent, respectively2.
Previous research has illustrated that high uncertainty and the rather long time horizon of 
venture capital investments makes managing financial risk crucial for venture capital firms’ 
performance3. Finance theory suggests that portfolio diversification should be especially 
beneficial for venture capital firms operating in such an uncertain environment, yet many 
venture capital firms hold poorly diversified portfolios. This study aims at evaluating the costs 
of gaining knowledge in certain industries, technologies, and venture stages. These costs, in 
turn, determine the level of diversification or specialization of venture capital firms.
Although co-investments are common practice among different venture capital firms, little 
research has been conducted on them - with few exceptions from Bygrave4 and Lemer5. 
Bygrave argues that information sharing, not spreading of financial risk, is the dominant 
reason for syndication6. However, other researchers7 claim that Bygrave’s results are also
1 Ministry of Trade and Industry. 1996. The SME Policy Programme 1996 in Finland, p 11
2 Coopers & Lybrand Corporate Finance. 1996. The Economic Impact of Venture Capital in Europe. European 
Venture Capital Association, p 7
3 Norton, E., Tenenbaum, B.H. 1993. Specialization versus Diversification as a Venture Capital Investment 
Strategy. Journal of Business Venturing, 8. p 432
4 Bygrave, W. 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: a network perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing, volume 2. pp 139-154
Bygrave,W. 1988. The Structure of the Investment Networks of Venture Capital Firms. Journal of Business 
Venturing, volume 3, 2. pp 137-158.
5 Lemer, J. 1994. The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments. Financial Management, volume 23, 3, 
Autumn 1994. pp 16-27
6 Bygrave, W. 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: a network perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing, volume 2. p 151
7 Norton, E. & Tenenbaum, B.H. 1993. Specialization versus Diversification as a Venture Capital Investment 
Strategy. Journal of Business Venturing, 8. p 436
consistent with the portfolio theory, which underlines the importance of spreading of financial 
risk. This study continues this discussion.
Previous research has studied how the uncertainty related to early venture stage, industry, and 
technology affect the venture capital firms’ propensity to syndicate. However, a related issue 
of if and how diversification affects syndication has not been studied.
There are three main contributions in this study. First and the most important contribution of 
this study relates to the evaluation of how diversification and syndication are interrelated. 
Second, the study aims at identifying how government related venture capital affects venture 
capital markets. Third, a new method in studying syndications, that is, asking venture 
capitalists directly for the reasons for syndication in a form of a questionnaire is used along 
with the actual investment data.
In more detail, this study aims at analyzing Finnish and Israeli venture capital firms’ degree of 
diversification and со-investing as well as evaluating the reasons for the companies to do so. 
Answering the research questions of this study should contribute to the theory and to practice. 
The theoretical contribution is a better understanding of the forces that affect venture capital 
firms’ degree of diversification. The study will also contribute to the understanding of the 
influences on the venture capital firm’s decision to syndicate. However, the most important 
theoretical contribution relates to the better understanding of the relationship between 
syndication and diversification. The practical contribution is expected to realize as the 
institutional investors, institutional venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and policy makers 
became aware of the possible implications of the results.
Studying how and why venture capital firms diversify and со-invest is likely to bring more 
light to risk management. After all, because venture capital involves high uncertainty, 
asymmetries of information, and outstanding opportunities of return, it gives an opportunity to 
study modem financial theory in a setting of extremes8.
1.2. Research Problem
The research problem is stated in the following the question:
To what extent do Finnish and Israeli venture capital firms diversify and syndicate their 
investments, with whom do they syndicate, and what are the reasons for doing so?
Chapter 1 Introduction 2
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1.3. Objectives of the Research
The concrete objectives of the research are stated below:
1. To evaluate the degree of diversification of the Finnish and Israeli venture capital 
firms.
2. To identify the most important factors, which affect the degree of investment 
diversification.
3. To measure the extent of syndication among venture capital firms in Finland and in 
Israel.
4. To identify how technology affects diversification and syndication patterns.
5. To identify the most important reasons for the existence of syndication in Finland 
and in Israel.
6. To evaluate how syndication enables venture capital firms to diversify their 
portfolios across industries, venture stages, portfolio companies, and location.
7. To identify how public funds affect venture capital markets.
1.4. Scope of the Research
This research is focused on Finland, because the research is a part of a larger project 
concentrating on the Finnish venture capital market. Since the Finnish venture capital market 
is rather young and small, a comparison is made with further-developed venture capital 
markets, such as the US and Israel, as benchmarking them is expected to be valuable. The 
comparison between Finland and Israel is motivated by a number of similarities between the 
countries. First, both countries have small domestic markets, which puts pressure for the 
young companies to internationalize early. Second, both countries have a high degree of small 
high-tech companies.
The comparison between Finland and Israel is also motivated by a number of distinct 
differences between the countries. First, Israel venture capital is dominated by high-tech 
investments, whereas the majority of capital in Finland is invested in low-tech ventures. 
Second, public funds have a strong position in the Finnish venture capital industry, whereas 
almost all Israeli venture capital funds are private. These differences allow me to study how 
technology and public money influence venture capital industry.
The research focuses on institutional venture capital firms. Institutional venture capital firms 
are usually organized in a way that a management company administers several venture
capital funds. This distinguishes institutional venture capital firms from informal venture 
capitalists, such as business angels9.
This paper views the diversification and syndication patterns from institutional investors and 
institutional venture capitalists perspective. The entrepreneurs’ view is not considered. Hence, 
a crucial question is what are the benefits for institutional investors from venture capital 
firms’ со-investing and diversification? Could the institutional investor not replicate the 
portfolio by investing directly to several different venture capital funds?
The research focuses on external syndications, that is, joint investments between two different 
venture capital firms. Internal syndications are not considered, because spreading of financial 
risk is the only reason for doing so, which makes internal syndication not as interesting from a 
theoretical point of view. Moreover first and later round syndications are only briefly 
discussed, due to the lack of data from Israel.
1.5. Research Methods
1.5.1. Literature Study
As a secondary research method an extensive literature review is conducted. Literature on 
diversification, portfolio theory, and syndication is reviewed and synthesized. This literature 
is complemented by literature focusing on venture capital firms. Based on this review, a 
theoretical model is developed.
1.5.2. Venture Capital Industry Analysis
The empirical data of this research is based on venture capital firms’ investment preferences 
and on actual investment data. In addition, the questionnaire shown in appendix 1 was sent to 
30 Finnish and 40 Israeli venture capital firms in September 1998. This is a new method of 
obtaining information on the reasons for syndication. All previous studies on the subject have 
been based on actual investment data. The investment preferences as well as the names and 
the addresses of the venture capital firms were obtained from the Finnish Venture Capital 
Association's booklet10 and from Israel Venture Association’s booklet11. Additional
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9 Turunen, H. 1995. Teknologian yritysten rahoitus. Master’s Thesis in Finance Theory. Helsinki School of 
Economics and Business Administration, p 20
10 Finnish Venture Capital Association, 1998. Directory of members 1998. pp 1-56
" Israel Venture Association. 1998. 1998 Yearbook, pp 1-240
Chapter 1 Introduction 5
information on the yearly industry survey "Ammattimainen pääomasijoittaminen Suomessa" 
was used in the analysis as well as measuring how well the companies that replied to the 
questionnaire represented the industry overall.
The empirical data is analyzed using statistical methods. Details on the empirical 
methodology are given in chapter six.
1.6. Definitions
1.6.1. Institutional Venture Capital Firm
Institutional venture capital firms are companies that invest in the form of equity financing 
and differ from other investors in three ways. First, the investment is an active one, in other 
words in addition to money, venture capital firms are also providing management support to 
their portfolio companies. Secondly, venture capital firms have a minority holding and thirdly, 
the investment period is rather long but of certain length12. I will use the abbreviation ‘ VCF’ 
to represent a venture capital firm from this point on. Institutional venture capital firms are 
usually organized in a way that a management company administers several venture capital 
funds.
4
12 Alho, K., Jutila, E. 1991. Venture Capital Funds in the Development of Technology Windows and New 
Business Ventures of Corporations. Helsinki University of Technology, p 3
Unfortunately theory and practice are quite apart here. A recent study on European venture 
capital found that 39 percent of venture capital investors had, in fact, majority stakes of their 
portfolio companies13. Moreover, the venture capital industry in Europe has been investing 
largely in the later venture stages, such as management buy-outs (MBOs) and management 
buy-ins (MBIs). Finland is no exception - results from 1997 show that approximately 60 
percent of the new capital invested was invested in either MBOs, MBIs, or in bridge 
financing14.
1.6.2. Institutional Venture Capitalist
An institutional venture capitalist, or simply a venture capitalist, is a person working for an 
institutional venture capital firm, who is responsible for making investment decisions and 
assisting portfolio companies.
1.6.3. Portfolio Company
A portfolio company is a company that receives funding from one or several different venture 
capital funds.
1.6.4. Types of syndications
An external syndication occurs when the same portfolio company receives funding from two 
different funds, which are managed by different venture capital firms. If not specifically 
mentioned otherwise, the word ‘syndication’ refers to an external syndication in this study.
An internal syndication occurs when the same portfolio company receives funding from two 
different funds, which are managed by the same venture capital firm.
A first round syndications occurs when a portfolio company that receives venture capital for 
the first time, receives funding from two different funds, which are managed by different 
venture capital firms.
Chapter 1 Introduction 6
13 Coopers & Lybrand Corporate Finance. 1996. The Economic Impact of Venture Capital in Europe. European 
Venture Capital Association, p 4
14 Borg, P. 1998. Ammattimainen pääoma sijoittaminen Suomessa 1997. Finnish Venturing Association ry. p 19
A later round syndication occurs when a portfolio company that has received funding from a 
venture capital firm, receives funding at later financial round from an another venture capital 
firm.
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Figure 1 Structure of the research
The report is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter contains the introduction, which 
presents objectives of the study as well as the methodology used to obtain data and analyze it. 
The second chapter describes briefly venture capitalists’ investment process and investment 
strategies, whereas previous researches on diversification and syndication are presented in 
chapters three and four. The fifth chapter introduces the initial model and summarizes the 
hypotheses presented in previous chapters. The empirical data and the methodology to analyze 
it are discussed in chapter six. The results from the venture capital industry analysis are then 
described in the seventh chapter. Chapter eight summarizes and discusses the central findings 
of the study and presents the final models for the sample countries. Finally, chapter nine 
discusses the findings in relation to literature, presents conclusions and implications of the 
results, and gives suggestions for further research.
2. Venture Capital Investment Process
Chapter 2 Venture Capital Investment Process 9
In order to understand investment decisions, post-investment activities, and the relationship 
between a venture capitalist and the portfolio company, one has to understand the whole 
venture capital investment process, which this chapter aims to briefly describe.
Tyebjee et al ,5formed a venture capital investment activity model, which divided the process 
into five major parts. The process shown in Figure 2 was presented by Bygrave et al.15 6 and is 
close to that presented in Tyebjee et al (1984), the only major difference being that the former 
emphasizes also exit strategies. It seems surprising that Tyebjee et al. left exit methods out of 
their process, since exit appears to be considered the one most important part of the process. 
After all, what is the use of value creation, if one cannot liquidate the capital gain? As a result, 
also academic literature on venture capital appears to focus on exit strategies, particularly on 
Initial Public Offerings, perhaps because such data is easily available for statistical analyses.
IEstablish fundTarget investment opportunities
Raise capital for investment |jj
I
Generate deal flow 
Identify new young 
companies with high potentialh
Screen and evaluate deals
I





Add value via post-investment activities
Craft and execute exit strategiesti
Figure 2 Classic venture capital investing process
15 Tyebjee, T, Bruno, A. 1984. A model of venture capitalist investment activity. Management Science, volume 
30, 9. p 1053
16 Bygrave, W, Timmons, J. 1992. Venture Capital at the Crossroads. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, p 
14
First, venture capitalists must decide the investment strategies for the fund. Second, they must 
raise capital, most often from institutional investors, such as pension funds, to build a fund. 
Third, venture capitalists should find and select investment opportunities that have great 
growth potential. If everything goes as planned, negotiations end with an investment contract. 
After closing the deal, a venture capitalist may add value by monitoring and assisting the 
portfolio company. Finally, typically after four to seven years, venture capitalists cash out 
through different exit methods.17
In essence, the venture capitalist acts as an intermediary between the original providers of 
capital and the portfolio company. In return for its intermediary function, the venture capitalist 
receives a two to three percent annual management fee and 15-25 percent of the capital gain. 
Original investors receive the principal and 75-85 percent of the capital gain. Typically the 
whole life cycle of a fund takes 10 years.18 The management company itself follows the 
principle of going concern. Figure 3 illustrates the venture capital firms’ role as an 
intermediary.
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17 Bygrave, W, Timmons, J. 1992. Venture Capital at the Crossroads. Harvard Business School Press. Boston.
pp 10-12
18 Bygrave, W, Timmons, J. 1992. Venture Capital at the Crossroads. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, 
pp 14-16
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Year О Year 4-7
variables affecting the success of the portfolio company
increased value of the portfolio company through growth and increased profitability
-*■ capital flow 
*■ information flow
Figure 3 Relationships between a venture capital firm, institutional investors, and 
portfolio companies
The venture capital firm differs from a typical business company in that a venture capital firm 
does not engage in any operational activity itself. It acts as an intermediary between investors 
and newly formed growth companies. There are at least three potential ways in which venture 
capital firms can add value and justify their existence19.
1. To bring investors and entrepreneurs together more efficiently than otherwise would 
happen20.
2. To make superior investment decisions to those the limited partners would make on 
their own21.
3. To provide non-financial assistance i.e. post-investment activities to their portfolio 
companies and thereby improving the venture’s risk-return mix22.
19 Gupta, A, Sapienza, H. 1992. Determinants of Venture Capital Firms' Preferences Regarding the Industry 
Diversity and Geographic Scope of Their Investments. Journal of Business Venturing, 7. p 349
20 Bygrave, W. 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: a network perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing, volume 2. p 152
21 Sandberg etal. 1987.
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Salliman claims that venture capitalists benefit institutional investors because the contracts 
venture capitalists negotiate address many of the moral hazard problems that may arise after 
the investment22 3. The extensive investment screening process reduces the adverse selection 
problem24. Fried and Hisrich argue that venture capitalists operate in a market with imperfect 
information and play a major role by serving as producers of information. Further, they argue 
that venture capitalists can obtain the information at lower costs than institutional investors 
would incur gathering the information directly. They state three reasons why venture 
capitalists have lower information-gathering costs. First, a venture capitalist is gathering the 
information on behalf of a number of investors, which allows him to take advantage of the 
economies of scale. Second, because a venture capitalist invests in a number of different 
portfolio companies, there are economies of scope. For example in creating an industry 
specific network. Third, venture capitalists benefit from a learning curve25. Information 
produced for one proposal is likely to be useful for subsequent proposals as well, which 
reduces the information-gathering costs.26
22 Gorman, M; Sahlman, W. 1986. What Do Venture Capitalists Do?. Journal of Business Venturing, 4. pp 231- 
248
23 Sahlman, W. 1990. The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 27. pp 473-521
24 Fried, V, Hisrich, R. 1994. Toward a Model of Venture Capital Investment Decision Making. Financial 
Management, volume 23, 3. p 35
25 Sahlman, W. 1990. The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 27. pp 473-521
26 Fried, V, Hisrich, R. 1994. Toward a Model of Venture Capital Investment Decision Making. Financial 
Management, volume 23, 3. p 36
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Sahlman has reported that over one-third of the investments by US venture capitalists resulted 
in total absolute losses during the 1969-1985 time frame. Only one of every 15 investments 
turned out to be an extraordinary success, bringing 49.4 percent of the ending value of the 
investor's portfolio and 61,4 percent of the investor's profit. The investment holding period 
averaged 4,9 years.27 These statistics illustrate well the high uncertainty and the rather long 
time horizon of venture capital investments. Thus, managing financial risk is crucial for 
venture capital firms’ performance.
The most apparent means with which venture capitalists control risk is the comprehensive 
screening process - in which only one to three percent of the proposals receive funding. In 
Finland, the percentage of investment proposals that do get funding has been around 6 percent 
during 1992-199728. Investment criteria and due diligence processes are, however, out of the 
scope of this paper. I also neglect the agency risk and concentrate purely on number of firms, 
industry, geography, venture stage, and staged financing issues that relate to venture capital 
firms' risk management. Fiet found that institutional venture capitalists are more concerned 
with market risk than agency risk, because they have learned to protect themselves 
contractually from agency risk29.
3.1.Portfolio theory
Markowitz has demonstrated that the two relevant characteristics of a portfolio are its 
expected return and risk. Markowitz made three key assumptions in his portfolio theory. First, 
he assumed that investors prefer efficient portfolios, that is, portfolios, which maximize the 
expected return for a given level of risk. Second, investors will use the variability of the 
expected returns as an estimate of the portfolio’s risk. Third, he assumed that investors are 
risk averse, that is, given two investment opportunities with equal expected return, investors 
will choose the one with the lower level of risk.30
27 Sahlman, W. 1990. The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 27. p 473
28 Information combined from six annual reports. Suomen pääomasijoitusyhdistys. 1993-1998. Ammattimainen 
pääomasijoittaminen Suomessa vuonna 1992-1997
29 Fiet, J. 1995. Risk Avoidance Strategies in Venture Capital Markets. Journal of Management Studies, 32, 4. 
p566
30 Markowitz, H. 1952. Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance, pp 77-91
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The portfolio theory states that the expected return of a portfolio of assets is simply the 
weighted average of the expected returns of all individual assets in the portfolio. However, the 
risk, standard deviation or variance, of the portfolio is not as straightforward to calculate. In 
computing the standard deviation of a portfolio one also needs to consider the covariance
between the assets in the portfolio. Covariance is a measure of the degree to which two assets
move to the same or opposite direction during the same time period31. When a portfolio is 
constructed from only a few assets, the standard deviation of the return of the portfolio 
depends firstly, on the variances of the individual assets, and secondly, on the covariance 
coefficients between the individual asset pairs. The equation of how to calculate standard 
deviation of a portfolio of assets is shown below.
Equation 1 Standard deviation of portfolio’s return
n 0 0 n n
However, when the number of assets increases in the portfolio, the covariance term becomes 
the dominant factor. As assets are added to the portfolio, the relative weight of the covariance 
term becomes greater. In fact, when the number of assets approaches infinity, the variance 
term approaches zero and the variance of the portfolio approaches asymptotically the sum of 
the weighted covariances. This is because if the assets are not perfectly correlated, the total 
standard deviation becomes less than the weighted average of the individual assets.
In summary, the risk of the individual assets, often called unsystematic risk, can be diversified 
away, but the systematic risk caused by the covariance term cannot be diversified away.32 
Numerous studies have confirmed the empirical validity of this portfolio diversification 
theory33.
Systematic and unsystematic risk
The most common components of risk are systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk 
arises from the effects of market or economy-wide factors, whereas unsystematic risk arises
31 Reilly, F. 1994. Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management. Fourth edition. The Dryden Press. Orlando.
32 Elton, E; Gruber, M. 1995. Modem Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis. Fifth edition. John Wiley & 
Sons Inc. New York. p60
from company, industry, or other aspects of asset-specific risk. Unsystematic risk can be 
reduced through diversification. Under the assumptions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
the financial markets, in which also venture capital firms operate, reward only systematic risk 
with a higher expected return33 4. Also the Arbitrage Pricing Theory assumes that investors are 
fully diversified and therefore exposed only to systematic risk influences35. Thus, finance 
theory in general, assumes diversified investors, that is, all firm or industry specific risk ought 
to be diversified away.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model includes assumptions - such as homogenous investor 
expectations, no transaction costs, and equal access to relevant information - which may not 
hold in the risk capital market36. For example, venture capital firms, like any other financial 
intermediary, may possess information or transaction cost advantages over other investors, 
which justify their existence. Sahlman argues that the beneficial learning curve effect arises 
from specializing in certain industries, which in turn provides access to networks37. Levy's 
Generalized Capital Asset Pricing Model introduced capital market segments, which arise 
from the fixed costs of gaining information38. Merton, on the other hand, pointed out that 
investors might possess specialized information in the field of their expertise. He argues that 
investors will invest only in those companies they are already well informed of, and omit all 
business areas unrelated to their specialized expertise39. All of these arguments give insight to 
the functioning of the risk capital market and possible explanations to why we see so many 
poorly diversified venture capital firms in the capital markets.
Chapter 3 Diversification versus Specialization 15
33 see for example Eun & Resnick. 1984. Estimating the Correlation Structure of International Share Prices. 
Journal of Finance, pp 1311-1324
34 Sharpe, W.F. 1964. A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk. Journal of Finance, pp 425- 
442
35 Ross, S. 1976. The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing. Journal of Economic Theory. pp343-362
36 Sharpe, W.F. 1964. A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk. Journal of Finance, pp 425- 
442
37 Sahlman, W. 1990 The structure and Governance of Venture capital organizations. Journal of Financial 
Economics. p500
38 Levy, H. 1991. Possible Explanations of non-synergy merger and small firm effect by the generalized CAPM. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 1, 1. pp 101-128
39 Merton, R.1987. A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information. Journal of 
Finance, 42,3. pp 483-510
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After studying 53 venture capital firms, Robinson et al pointed out that venture capital firms 
will differentiate according to high-to-low levels of staff assistance*, size of investment, 
sources of equity capital, and degree of vertical integration in the level of the generation-to- 
management of investments chain40. Bygrave drew attention to the importance of industry- 
specific knowledge. He suggested that ”expertise, especially industry-specific knowledge on 
markets and technology, is an important - perhaps the dominant - determinant of venture 
capitalists’ investment behavior. Therefore, we believe that the industry-specific knowledge 
will play a major role in future segmentation of the venture capital industry”41.
Because many industries have low correlation with each other, investing in different industries 
enables an investor to take advantage of the portfolio diversification. Also venture capitalists 
can reduce unsystematic risk by diversifying their investments across several different 
industries similar to mutual funds, which can invest in different publicly traded companies in 
different industries.
Although portfolio diversification is a well-known means of minimizing unsystematic risk, 
Bygrave argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization may be useful for controlling 
risk as well as gaining access to networks, information, and deal flow from other venture 
capitalists42. Moreover, to diminish information asymmetries and the risk of adverse selection, 
investors invest in familiar industries to be in a better position to assess the venture’s profit 
potential.
If the risk-return mix were viewed as unalterable, i.e. if the venture capital firm was not 
creating any additional value beyond capital, venture capital investments by venture capital 
firms would be similar to any other portfolio of passive investment. In such case, the well- 
proven heuristics suggested by financial economics, e.g. Sharpe43 1981, should apply. Hence, 
Finance theory suggests that those venture capital firms focusing on early venture stage, that
similar to the Close-tracker -laissez-faire -categorization in MacMillan, I; Kulow, D; Khoylian, R. 1988. 
Venture Capitalists involvement in their investments: extent and performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 
volume 4. pp 27-47
40 Robinson et al. 1986
41 Bygrave, W. 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: a network perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing, volume 2. p 153
42 Bygrave,W. 1988. The Structure of the Investment Networks of Venture Capital Firms. Journal of Business 
Venturing, volume 3, 2. p 139
is, more risky investments should prefer greater industry diversification.43 4 If venture capital 
firms seek to control unsystematic risk by way of portfolio diversification, the following 
hypothesis should be true:
HI a: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a more diverse set of industries 
than other venture capital firms.
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However, should the risk-return mix be partially alterable due to venture capital firm’s 
involvement and assistance, then the need to develop specialized industry knowledge and 
experience, and working in close interaction with the ventures, is likely to act as a strict 
constraint on the venture capital firm’s preference for high industry diversification. 
Furthermore these constraints can be expected to have a more severe impact on those venture 
capital firms that focus on early stage ventures. Early stage technology-based venturing 
usually requires deep understanding of the underlying technology to assess its value, which 
would suggest a focused approach. Moreover, later stage ventures, such as management buy­
outs, can be fairly easy to make regardless of the industry, because buyouts require more 
financing know-how than industry know-how.
Due to venture capital firms’ expertise and information advantage in certain industries and 
technologies, and given the high fixed costs of gaining the similar knowledge in other 
unrelated industries and technologies, it would seem uneconomical for a venture capitalist 
firm to pursue an extensive portfolio diversification strategy. Thus if information sharing and 
specialization are means of controlling risk, I have the following hypothesis:
Hlb: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a less diverse set of industries 
than other venture capital firms.
Gupta and Sapienza studied the preferences for portfolio diversification of US venture capital 
firms. The study suggested that venture capitalists that focus on early stage ventures are
43 Sharpe, W. F. 1981. Decentralized investment management Journal of Finance, volume 36, 2. pp 217-234
44 Gupta, A, Sapienza, H. 1992. Determinants of Venture Capital Firms' Preferences Regarding the Industry 
Diversity and Geographic Scope of Their Investments. Journal of Business Venturing, 7. p 350
smaller and less industrially diversified than those concentrating on later stage ventures45. 
Hence, their results are in favor of the specialization hypothesis. One quite obvious reason is 
that larger venture capital firms have more human resources and are more capable of 
diversifying their portfolio.
Norton et al. have studied diversification of American venture capital firms. Their study, 
which covered 98 venture capitalists, found also evidence favoring the specialization 
hypothesis. They found that investors in seed and first stage financing deals were less 
diversified across industries and firms46.
3.3. Venture St a ge Diversifica tion
Venture capitalists are subject to a great amount of unsystematic risk in each of their portfolio 
companies, especially those focusing on early stage ventures. Figure 4 illustrates the factors 
underlying the discount rates, which venture capital firms use to value companies. These 
factors are: to provide a base return at least equal to the risk free rate, to provide compensation 
for risk bearing, to compensate for illiquidity, to take into account the value added by the 
venture capitalist, and to adjust future cash flow projections to reflect experience and 
skepticism.47
Elago et al found that venture capital firms focusing on early stage sought ventures with 
higher potential returns - a 42 and 33 percent hurdle rate of return for early stage and late 
stage venture capital firms, respectively48. While early stage investments have generated 
higher returns in the US49, European early stage funds have generated significantly poorer
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47 Harvard Business School. 1987. A method for valuing high-risk, long-term investments. Teaching note 9-288- 
006. p 17
48 Elango, B. Fried, V. H. Hisrich, R.D. Polonchek, A. 1995. How Venture Capital Firms Differ. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 10. p 167
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pp 149-165
returns than MBO funds50. Lumme et al. suggest that the results may reflect a scarcity of 
classic venture capital skills in Europe51 52.




Figure 4 Factors underlying discount rates52
Gupta and Sapienza list four sources of uncertainties, which make early stage ventures more 
uncertain than what more established firms are:53
1. more demand uncertainties (customer base, acceptance)
2. technological uncertainties (product & process)
3. resource uncertainty (availability of skilled personnel, dependability on key 
personnel, raw materials, channels of distribution)
4. management uncertainties (founder, management team, balance)
50 BVCA. 1996. Press release: Independent venture capital funds increase returns to investors. London. British 
Venture Capital Association.
51 Lumme, A, Mason, C, Suomi, M. 1998. Informal Venture Capital: Investors, Investments and Policy Issues in 
Finland. Klüver Academic Publishers. Boston, p 9
52 Harvard Business School. 1987. A method for valuing high-risk, long-term investments. Teaching note 9-288-
006. p 18
53 Gupta, A, Sapienza, H. 1992. Determinants of Venture Capital Firms' Preferences Regarding the Industry 
Diversity and Geographic Scope of Their Investments. Journal of Business Venturing, 7. p 350
Based on finance theory, one would expect the desire to diversify to be stronger for those 
venture capitalists with large relative commitments to the seed and first stage investments.54
Liquidity risk is another source of unsystematic risk. Liquidity risk can be divided into two 
aspects. The first aspect is company specific, i.e. the difficulty in exiting from an unsuccessful 
investment. This difficulty depends on numerous factors. To reduce company specific 
liquidity risk, portfolio diversification theory suggests that venture capitalists would be better 
off by constructing a well-diversified portfolio. The second aspect of liquidity risk deals with 
the timing of exit of a successful venture. There seems to be good and bad periods to cash out 
in the public equity market, e.g. IPO market. During good or "hot" times the valuations of 
small businesses are high compared to bad or "cold" times. According to portfolio 
diversification theory, venture capitalists should try to minimize the timing liquidity risk by 
not only trying to seek to diversify across firms and industries but also across different 
financial stages55. Thus, if portfolio diversification is a means of controlling venture stage 
risk, I have the following hypothesis:
H2a: Venture capitalists seek to control unsystematic liquidity risk will lead
them to diversify across several different venture stages.
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Again one might argue that due to venture capital firms’ expertise and information advantage 
in certain venture stages, and given the high fixed costs of gaining the similar knowledge in 
other unrelated venture stages, it would seem uneconomical for a venture capitalist firm to 
pursue an extensive venture stage diversification strategy. Thus if information sharing and 
specialization are means of controlling risk, I have the following hypothesis:
H2b: The venture capitalists ’ strategy to specialize in order to enhance their
position in networks and information sharing flows will lead them to 
concentrate in one financing stage or several consecutive financing 
stages.
Norton et al.’s study, which covered 98 venture capitalists, found evidence favoring the 
specialization hypothesis. They found that venture capitalists appeared to specialize in certain
54 Norton, E., Tenenbaum, B.H. 1993. Specialization versus Diversification as a Venture Capital Investment 
Strategy. Journal of Business Venturing, 8. p 434
55 Norton, E, Tenenbaum, B.H. 1993. Specialization versus Diversification as a Venture Capital Investment 
Strategy. Journal of Business Venturing, 8. p 434
financial stages rather than stagger their investments over different venture stages. There was 
a significant positive relationship between nearby stages as a result of follow-on investment 
and a negative relationship between financial stages that were not consecutive.56
3.4. Geographic Diversifica tion
If the asset universe is expanded outside state or national borders so that also other than 
domestic assets are included, we have a much larger variety of assets to invest in. It should be 
intuitively clear that it should be easier to find assets, which are less correlated with each 
other. One of the key issues in determining the benefits from geographic diversification is that 
the investor must be able to find investment opportunities, which could not be found in local 
markets. If the foreign assets are duplicates of those found domestically, then there are no new 
real investment opportunities for investors and, therefore, no additional benefits from 
geographic diversification.57
Asset returns are usually much less correlated across different countries than within a single 
country, because economical, political, institutional and psychological factors, which all affect 
assets' returns, lead to lower correlation among international assets compared to domestic 
assets. Several empirical studies have confirmed that inter-country correlation coefficients are 
indeed lower than intra-country ones58. These results imply that investors should be able to 
substantially gain from geographic diversification in terms of risk reduction.
Haavisto and Hansson studied diversification within the Nordic stock markets and found that 
the correlation coefficients between the Nordic markets were surprisingly low, even though 
the Nordic region is often considered to be fairly homogenous in terms of economic, political, 
and social environment. They suggested that the low correlation could partially be due to the 
differences in the industrial structure of the countries.59 If their argument is true, there is less 
potential for venture capital firms, especially those focusing on few industries, to benefit from 
Nordic geographic diversification.
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A more recent study by Liljeblom et al. suggests that the correlation between national stock 
markets has increased, especially in the Nordic region. This further reduces the benefits, 
which can be obtained from geographic diversification. One explanation is that the large 
corporations have become increasingly international60. Since most of the venture capital firms’ 
portfolio companies are also aiming at international markets and many of them, despite of 
their small size, are operating internationally, the above statement applies well to venture 
capital backed companies. Nevertheless geographic diversification can still be regarded as a 
highly potential means of reducing unsystematic risk.
Sapienza et al’s research has shown that US venture capitalists seem to change their level and 
nature of involvement in accordance with situation specific factors. They discovered that US 
venture capitalists were more highly involved and in more frequent interactions with the 
portfolio company if it was in its early venture stage61. Because an early venture stage requires 
more face-to-face interaction, it would seem desirable for venture capitalists that the portfolio 
companies would locate close to the venture capital firm’s office. Thus, the following 
hypothesis:
H3a: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a narrower geographic scope 
than other venture capital firms.
As mentioned earlier Gupta and Sapienza studied the preferences for portfolio diversification 
of US venture capital firms. The study suggested that venture capitalists that focus on early 
stage ventures are less geographically diversified than those concentrating on later stage 
ventures62. Elago et al. found that venture capital firms, which invest in early stage or small 
late stage ventures, tend to be geographically concentrated. They claim that venture capital 
firms making large investments can spread the fixed transaction cost of travel and the 
opportunity cost of the travel time over a larger investment63.
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Distance to the portfolio company has been found to affect venture capitalists’ level of 
involvement in their portfolio companies. Sapienza et al. have found that distance to the 
portfolio firm reduces the level of involvement64. Lemer’s results are in conformity with this. 
He found that distance to the firm is negatively related to the board membership of venture 
capitalists65.
According to portfolio theory industry-, venture stage-, and geographic- diversification can be 
used as alternative means of diversifying one’s portfolio. Hence, they are in some sense 
substitutes for each other. For example, an investor can compensate the lack industry 
diversification by diversifying across a larger number of venture stages or across broader 
geographic scope. In addition, information-sharing hypothesis pulls to this same direction. I 
argue that in order to maintain a sufficient number of deals a VCF specializing in certain 
industries must look for investment opportunities within a broader geographic scope. For 
example, a VCF focusing purely on biotechnology cannot afford to look for portfolio 
companies only from Southern Finland, it simply must have a broader geographic scope in 
order to receive sufficient deal flow. Thus, I hypothesize
H3b: Venture capital firms that invest within a less diverse set of industries
will look for investment opportunities within a broader geographic 
scope than other venture capital firms.
This question has not been stressed before in literature. Although Gupta et al. did not study 
the relationship between the industry diversification and geographic scope, a significantly 
positive correlation is shown in a correlation table in their paper66. This result suggests, 
although not mentioned by the authors, that those venture capital firms with well industry- 
diversified portfolios also tend to prefer a larger geographic scope. These results are opposite 
to what I hypothesized.
3.5. Capital Resources
Unlike in the typical operating company, the growth of a venture capital firm’s size comes 
exclusively through infusion of fresh capital by outside investors. Investors are unlikely to
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overlook past performance when making investment decisions. Thus, one can argue that those 
venture capital firms, which can show a convincing track record, are in a better position to 
obtain new funds and to grow. This logic implies that those venture capital firms with a larger 
pool of funds are assumed to possess a larger accumulated base of capabilities than those 
venture capital firms with a small amount of capital under management do.67
Gupta and Sapienza name the three following reasons to why venture capital firms’ size is 
expected to be related to industry diversity and geographic scope. First, larger venture capital 
firms are more likely to need a large set of investment opportunities. Second, larger venture 
capital firms probably possess an extensive network, which offers more potential deals. Third, 
large venture capital firms may have accumulated superior capabilities, which allow them to 
invest in a wider set of industries68.1 assume that similar reasoning applies in Finland as well, 
and therefore, my hypotheses are as follows:
H4a: Venture capital firm with a larger pool of capital under management
will prefer venture investments within a more diverse set of industries 
than other venture capital firms.
H4b: Venture capital firm with a larger pool of capital under management
will prefer venture investments within a broader geographic scope than 
other venture capital firms.
Gupta and Sapienza did indeed discover that larger venture capital firms were more industry 
and geographically diversified69. According to Sadtler, most venture capitalists, in UK feel 
they do not have the luxury to specialize in some specific industry, because they want to 
assess as many investment proposals as possible in order to pick out the few winners. 
Recently however, some larger firms have recruited specialists and built relevant business 
portfolios around them.70
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3.6. Public versus Priva те Sources of Funds
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Public funds have historically dominated venture capital industry in Finland. Figure 5 shows 
the share of capital under management of public and private venture capital firms. At the same 
time, private money has increased its share, the investment focus has moved to later stage 
ventures, as can be seen in Figure 6. This trend poses a question -what are the differences in 
investment behavior that are related to the origin of capital.
Amount of capital under management in private and public venture capital firms in Finland between
1991-1997
E
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
■ Public 
Ш Private
Figure 5 Amount of capital under management held by public and private venture 
capital firms in Finland during 1991-1997
Chapter 3 Diversification versus Specialization 26
Investments by venture stages in Finland during 1992-1997
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Figure 6 Capital invested by venture stages in Finland during 1992-1997
Many public funds have stated in their mission statements that their primary goal is to help 
small companies to grow. Even some of the names like Start Fund of Kera and Spinno-seed 
give a clear picture of the venture stage to which the money should go. Moreover, government 
is promoting high technology in Finland. For example TEKES gives subsidies and grants to 
small technology-based companies.
Private and public funds may have different attitudes towards risk and return. Where private 
firms compete in the capital markets, where the investment decisions must be based purely on 
the expected return and risk, public funds may have additional investment criteria. 
Government related financial institutions are more likely to be pursuing to help young 
technology-based companies grow than invest in mature low-tech firms. Private funds, on the 
other hand, are not as strict about their venture stage or industry focus, if the expected return 
is adequate for the associated risk. Thus I hypothesize the following:
H5a: Venture capital firm with public sources of funds will focus more on
high-tech industries than private venture capital firms.
H5b: Venture capital firm with public sources offunds will prefer more early
stage ventures than private venture capital firms.
Gupta and Sapienza discovered that public capital funds tend to be more geographically 









correlation between public funds and industrial diversity, suggesting that public funds tend to 
be less industry diversified. This is somewhat surprising since US public funds preferred 
significantly more later stage ventures than private venture capital firms.71
3.7.Staged Financing
Venture capitalists typically fund firms in staged capital commitments, where money is given 
to a company based on some predefined milestones. According to Gorman and Sahlman, 
venture capitalists tend to give only the minimum money required, in discrete amounts closely 
matched to the attainment of milestones. They suggest that through staged financing, venture 
capitalists are able to limit damage by refusing additional financing, in case the company is 
unsuccessful in early stages.72 Perhaps the best way to understand this is to think of a decision 
tree, where the opportunity to make the decision in the future is valuable because more 
information of the possible outcomes is then available. This opportunity can be thought of as a 
call-option.
3.8. Institutional Investors’ View
Pension funds have allocated only a couple of percent of their funds into venture capital 
funds. Why should venture capital firms diversify if the institutional investors can do it 
themselves? Arbitrage guarantees that institutional investors are unwilling to reward venture 
capital companies from diversification which they can replicate themselves at no greater 
costs73. The question then becomes one of related synergies and of how well venture capital 
firms communicate their investment strategies to the institutional investors. If there are high 
costs of obtaining information and gaining knowledge in certain industries or venture stages, 
then venture capital firms ought to specialize in related areas and inform institutional 
investors well of their investment strategies. This information would help the institutional 
investor better manage his portfolio’s risk.
Norton et al drew attention to venture capitalists’ diversification from institutional investors’ 
point of view by stating the following question. “Why aren’t venture capitalist “supermarkets” 
more prevalent? Venture capitalist supermarkets can allow the best of both worlds - an 
overall portfolio diversified in terms of time and industry, with experts overseeing sub-
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portfolios that are specified in terms of industries and financing stage.”73 4 One possible 
explanation is that the learning curve of a VCF is steeper when there are several individuals in 
the same organization that can accumulate knowledge in one industry or venture stage.
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4. Venture Capital Networks and the Degree of 
Syndication
Uncertainty dominates the venture capital industry, especially the early-stage innovative 
ventures. Good information and experience are vital in order to make good investment 
decisions. It has been said that 100 decision-makers control the US venture capital industry 
through networks75. One of the most obvious ways to broaden one's network with other 
venture capitalists is to со-invest, in other words, syndicate with them.
Despite the fact that syndication of investments is common practice among venture capitalists, 
little research has been conducted on it. Lemer suggests that the scarcity of research may be 
due to the difficulty of analyzing syndication patterns empirically, and to the complexity of 
motives behind syndication76.
There are two important types of formal linkages between venture capital firms and their 
portfolio companies - syndication of investments and seats on the board of directors of those 
companies. Both formal and informal information flows though these linkages. Formal 
information is communicated through budgets, financial statements, annual meetings, 
business plans, etc., whereas informal information is communicated through casual meetings, 
phone calls, and informal written documents.77
Bygrave expects that the frequency of communication between two venture capital firms 
would depend on the number of portfolio companies, in which they have jointly invested. 
Hence, the greater the number of syndicated investments, the stronger the ties between the 
venture capital firms78. This assumption seems reasonable since venture capitalists often serve 
on the boards of their portfolio companies and therefore meet other venture capitalists at least 
in the board meetings. When Rosenstein et al. studied the board composition of US portfolio 
companies, they discovered that the typical board comprised 1,7 inside members, 2,3 venture
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capital principals, 0,3 venture capital staff, and 1,3 other outsiders79. These numbers illustrate 
that venture capitalists are well represented in the boards of their portfolio companies.
In addition to the frequency between a pair of firms, the number of communication links with 
different venture capital firms can measure the extent of the network. Thus, the greater the 
number of different venture capital firms with which a firm has syndicated investments, the 
broader its network, and the greater its influence in the network80.
4.1. Resource Exchange Model
Bygrave argues that the resource exchange model of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) is useful in 
explaining the networks of venture capital firms. It is a theory with three structural variables: 
1 ) concentration, which is the degree to which power is concentrated in the environment; 2) 
munificence, which is the availability of resources; and 3) interconnectedness, which is the 
number linkages among organizations. These three variables determine how organizations 
interact. This interaction is characterized by two variables: 1) conflict and 2) interdependence. 
Furthermore, conflict and interdependence determine the amount of uncertainty the company 
confronts.
According to the resource exchange model, a rational organization tries to manipulate 
structural variables, concentration, munificence, and interconnectedness, in a way that will 
reduce uncertainty. “When situations of exchange and competition are uncertain and 
problematic, organizations attempt to establish linkages with elements in their environment 
and use those linkages to access resources, to stabilize outcomes, and to avert environmental 
control.”81
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4.1.1. Interconnectedness
According to the resource exchange model, the interconnectedness of a firm is a "function of 
uncertainty, munificence, and the degree of concentration of its industry"82 More formally:
79 Rosenstein, J, Bruno, A. Bygrave, W, Taylor, N. 1993 The CEO, Venture Capitalists, and the Board. Journal 
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interconnectedness =/(uncertainty, munificence, concentration)
Interconnectedness itself measures the degree to which firms within an industry are linked 
together into a network. Here, I measure the degree of interconnectedness by the number of 
external syndications a VCF has made.
The resource exchange model predicts that the interconnectedness is greater the more 
uncertain and the less munificent the industry is. The logic behind is that high uncertainty 
makes sharing of information to reduce uncertainty more valuable than when the uncertainty 
is low. When the uncertainty is high, also the marginal benefit from degreasing the level of 
uncertainty is high, which makes the syndication economically desirable. Moreover, the 
munificence affects the interconnectedness because firms need to co-operate more when they 
lack the resources to do business efficiently alone. Finally, the resource exchange model 
predicts that the interconnectedness is highest in industries with intermediate levels of 
concentration. For when there are only a few large firms in an industry, there is little need to 
improve coordination, and when there is a great number of companies in an industry, it is 
merely impossible to have enough links to improve coordination distinguishably.83
4.1.2. Munificence
Munificence is the degree to which the resources, such as capital, customers, and employees, 
that a venture capital firm needs to gather from its environment, are abundant. The main 
resources that a venture capital firm needs are capital, a flow of deals, and talented people to 
manage its investments.
Venture capital firms are constantly raising new capital for new funds from which to invest. 
The amount of capital raised each year has grown steadily throughout 90’s in Finland84. 
According to the resource exchange model, the greater the resources of capital, the greater is 
the capacity to spread financial risk internally, and the less need to syndicate investments*. 
Thus,
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* Because syndication divides the total investment into smaller parts, the investment size is smaller then if the 
VCF would do it alone.
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H6a Venture capital firms with large capital resources have a lower
propensity to syndicate than those venture capital firms with smaller 
capital resources.
Bygrave found that the amount of capital under management was unrelated to the proportional 
amount of со-investing. He believes this finding suggests that sharing of expertise is the 
predominant factor affecting venture capital firms’ syndication decisions. He could not, 
however, study the relative importance of the spreading of risk within a portfolio, because he 
lacked data of the amount invested by each venture capital firm in each portfolio company.85
A study of joint ventures among the top 20 U.S. oil companies found that the number of joint 
ventures rose steadily with the size of the oil company. This finding is contradictory to the 
financial risk-sharing hypothesis, because large firms have less need to share risk than smaller 
ones do.86
In Finland, raising capital does not seem to be the bottleneck for most of the venture capital 
firms. Only a third of the capital raised has been invested so far87. Hence, one could argue that 
also in Finland, there is too much money chasing too few deals. Because of the high 
unemployment in Finland in the 90’s, finding talented people to manage investments should 
not have been an impossible task to accomplish. Thus, it seems that in the 90’s, the critical 
resource has been an abundant supply of deals from which to select a new portfolio company. 
Therefore I hypothesize that:
H6b Venture capital firms with better availability of prospective investments
have a lower degree of connectedness.
4.1.3. Concentration
The resource exchange model also predicts that the interconnectedness is highest in industries 
with intermediate levels of concentration. For when there are only a few large firms in an 
industry, there is little need to improve coordination, and when there is a great number of 
companies in an industry, it is merely impossible to have enough links to improve
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coordination distinguishably. Coordination is a means of reducing uncertainty in market 
competition and in sources of supply88. Venture capital firms are both competitors and 
suppliers to each other, for they compete for funds and for prospective deals, yet they also 
share deals that are syndicated. Thus, it is expected that the venture capital industry will have 
a relatively high degree of interfirm linkages. My hypotheses relating to the concentration are 
as follows:
H7a Venture capital firms within a more concentrated group, measured by
capital invested, have a higher degree of propensity to invest among 
themselves
H7b Venture capital firms located nearby have a higher degree ofpropensity
to invest among themselves
In an extensive study of syndicated investments, which covered 1501 portfolio companies and 
464 US venture capital firms, Bygrave found that the top 61 venture capital firms were 
managing 57% of the total pool of venture capital. He also found that top venture capital firms 
were geographically concentrated, as 38 of the top 61 companies were located in just three 
states. Moreover, the top 61 venture capital firms seemed to have substantial influence in the 
venture capital industry through their extensive networks - they had namely invested in 72,8 
percent of all portfolio companies. The top 21 HIVCs (High Innovative Venture Capital 
Firms) and the top 19 MIVCs (Medium Innovative Venture Capital Firms) combined had 
invested in 65,9 percent of the HITVs (High Innovative Technological Ventures). Bygrave 
classified the U.S. venture capital industry as having intermediate concentration at most.89
Bygrave found that the top 61 firms did not show significantly greater propensity to co-invest 
among themselves than with the other 403 venture capital firms.90 However, California HIVCs 
had significantly (p<0,01) greater propensity to invest among themselves than HIVCs overall. 
He argues that the higher observed number of co-investments among California HIVCs can be 
partially explained by the degree of concentration. He discovered that California HIVCs 
managed 71 percent of the total pool, and argued that this relatively high degree of
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concentration made them aware of competition among themselves and therefore encouraged 
co-investments.
However, Bygrave did not control for geographic distance. Previous research has shown that 
high-tech venture capital firms focus on the early stage91. In addition, early venture stages are 
found to require more of a ”hands on” involvement from the venture capitalists. This 
involvement naturally requires proximity92. This would partially explain why Californian 
HIVCs prefer to со-invest among themselves.
4.1.4. Uncertainty
Bygrave measured the uncertainty factor in his study using three variables: technology, 
venture stage, and industry. Bygrave divided the portfolio companies into high and low 
innovative technological ventures (HIT Vs and LIT Vs) by asking venture capitalists to rate 
their level of technology used in producing or delivering the product or service, and the 
technology used in application of the product or service93.
Because investing in high technology ventures is highly uncertain and requires sophisticated 
technical knowledge, there would seem to be a clear need to share expertise in order to reduce 
uncertainty.
В y grave found that the overall connectedness of US venture capital industry was only 2,3 
percent, but among the top 21 high-tech firms, it was already 37 percent, and for the 9 
Californian top 21 high-tech firms it was 69 percent. The analysis showed that high-tech 
venture capital firms are more interconnected than low-tech venture capital firms. This finding 
is consistent with the resource exchange model, since more uncertainty should imply more 
interconnectedness.94 The fact that venture capital firms focusing on high technology ventures 
syndicate proportionally more, could be explained by the sharing of information to reduce 
uncertainty, or the sharing of financial risk, or both.
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Interestingly, the data shows that the average investment size is significantly smaller for high- 
tech investments than for low-tech investments, which led Bygrave to conclude that co­
investing is driven much more by the need to share expertise than by the need to spread 
financial risk. For, if it was purely the spreading of financial risk, then the greater the amount 
of invested per portfolio company, the greater the number of syndicated investments would 
be, all other things being equal.95
Bygrave also studied the uncertainty associated with the venture stage by dividing the 
portfolio companies into two groups: the early stage and the late stage companies. Similarly to 
the results regarding technology, Bygrave found that the proportional ratio of syndication was 
significantly higher in the early stage than in the late stage companies, even though the 
average total investment size was significantly less for the early stage ventures. Once again 
Bygrave interpreted these results in favor of information sharing hypothesis by stating that 
“the principal reason for со-investing was not spreading of financial risk. Rather it was the 
sharing of expertise.”96.
Finally, Bygrave studied the uncertainty associated with the industry of the portfolio 
company. He compared the amount of со-investing in computer and consumer products 
industries. He chose these industries, “because, in general, there is much more product 
technology and uncertainty in computer than consumer products”97. As was expected, the ratio 
of syndicated investment pairs to single investments in computer companies was almost five 
times greater than in consumer companies. Yet there was no difference in the total amount of 
invested per company between the two industries. Bygrave went as far as arguing that the 
main reason for со-investing is the sharing of expertise.98 However, the results only reveal that 
the extra uncertainty associated with high technology ventures or early venture stage 
overweighs the investment size effect, which pulls to the other direction. Thus, By grave’s 
argument is too strong with respect to the results. The results are, indeed, consistent with the 
portfolio theory.
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I will measure the degree of venture capital firms' uncertainty by industry and venture-stage 
index. I assume that those venture capital firms concentrating on early venture stages and on 
high-tech industries face a greater amount of uncertainty than those focusing on late and low- 
tech firms do. According to the resource exchange model, I hypothesize:
H8a: venture capital firms focusing on early stage companies have a higher
degree of connectedness than those venture capital firms investing in 
more mature ventures
H8b: venture capital firms focusing on high-tech companies have a higher
degree of connectedness than those venture capital firms investing in 
low-tech ventures
4.2. Connectedness
The connectedness of a network is the percentage of pairs of venture capital firms with one or 
more actual co-investment to the maximum number of all possible pairs. Thus, for a group 
with N members, the maximum number of intragroup direct links is N(N-1); for two separate 
groups with К and L members, the maximum number of intergroup direct links is KL.
Let us now look closer at the formulas that Bygrave used to measure the network of US 
venture capital firms. Consider two venture capital firms, i and j, investing in the same subset, 
s, of companies. The number of their joint investments, y(s), is given by the following 
equation:
yv(s) = aij(s)Xipi(s)XjPj(s) , where
Equation 2 The number of joint investments of two venture capital firms
xf is the number of investments in i's portfolio
Pi(s) is the propensity of i to invest in subset s of portfolio companies
aÿ is the propensity of venture capital firm i to invest jointly with j in the 
subset s of companies.
The number of investments in i's portfolio, щ, is the total capital invested by i in its portfolio 
companies divided by the average amount invested per portfolio company.
4.3. Intragroup Syndica tion
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The total number of co-investments by all pairs within a group of venture capital firms is 
given by equation 3,
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y(s) = Yj ^av(s)npi(s)njpj(s)
i j
Equation 3 Total number of intragroup syndication
where ay can be assumed to be the intragroup constant, A, that captures the resource exchange 
model's variables of uncertainty, munificence, and concentration for this homogeneous group 
of venture capital firms.
4.4. Intergroup Syndica tion
If there are two groups of venture capital firms, к and m, the total number of со- investments 
by all intergroup pairs in subset, s, of portfolio companies is Z(s):
Z(S) = J] У, bkm(s)nkpk(s)rimpm(s)
Equation 4 Total number of intergroup syndication
bcan be assumed to be the intergroup constant, B, which captures the resource exchange 
model's variables of uncertainty, munificence, and concentration for these two different types 
of groups of venture capital firms.
4.5.STRENGTH OF CONNECTIONS
The connectedness measures only the existence of direct links between different venture 
capital firms. It ignores the strength of these links, because if two venture capital firms have 
syndicated even once, a connection exists. In order to take into account the strength of the 
link, one could measure the number of times that syndication has occurred among the venture 
capital firms. The number of direct links, also called the number of pairs of investors, can be 
used as a measure of the strength of the connection. The number of direct links in a portfolio 
company with N investor is N(N-l)/2. So if a portfolio company has two investors, it has one 
pair of co-investors; three investors, three pairs; four investors, six pairs; and so on. 
Obviously, if a company has only one investor, it has no direct links." The total number of 
direct links can be used as a measure of a given venture capital firm’s interconnectedness with 
its network.
" Bygrave,W. 1988. The Structure of the Investment Networks of Venture Capital Firms. Journal of Business 
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4.6. Centrality
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Centrality measures the relative importance in the network. Bygrave uses three different 
measures to estimate centrality. First measure counts only the connectedness, that is the 
existence of a direct link. The problem of this measure is, of course, that it gives as much 
weight to a connection with just one co-investment as with multiple co-investments. The 
second measure is the intensity, which weights a connection in direct proportion to the 
number of co-investments. The third and most advanced measure overcomes this problem by 
scaling the weight from 0 to 1 so, that it approaches 1 asymptotically. Still another possible 
measure of centrality is the cumulated distance from other members of the network. Aldrich 
and Whetten define a measure called index of point centrality shown in equation 5, where 
np(zV) is the number of points reachable from i and d(ij) is the distance between points I, and 
j. Distance is measured by the number of direct links that are required to connect two venture 
capital firms. Thus, a direct connection has a distance of 1, a connection via two links has a 
distance of 2, and so on.
hi}) = [np(i,j)f - XyO'J)
j
Equation 5 Index of point centrality
Bygrave found that the first three measures of centrality give similar results and suggest that 
network of top 21 HIVCs is hierarchical. However the network seems to be flat in terms of 
point centrality. Because Bygrave did not have the information of lead investors, normally the 
originator of the deal, he was unable to measure the directionality of the links.100
4.7.Reasons for Syndication
Bygrave reported that venture capitalists often prefer to spread risk and information through a 
network of co-investors101. Bygrave has argued that the most important reason for venture 
capital firms to syndicate is because they want to share information not because they want to 
share financial risk. This subchapter divides these two main reasons into subreasons and 
discusses each potential subreason separately.
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4.7.1. Spreading of Financial Risk
Syndication enables financial risk diversification according to four dimensions. First, 
syndication enables a venture capital firm to со-invest in different venture stages with other 
venture capital firms, which might be more experienced in the venture stage in question. 
Second, syndication enables a venture capital firm to со-invest in different industries with 
other venture capital firms, which might have expertise in that industry. Third, syndication 
enables a venture capital firm to diversify across geographic scope, because other venture 
capitalists can do the monitoring and post-investment activities for the other syndication 
partners. Finally, syndication enables a venture capital firm to diversify across a greater 
number of otherwise similar companies, and therefore, to diversify away the company specific 
risk. For example, instead of investing 10 million in one company a venture capital firm could 
syndicate and invest 2,5 million in four similar companies in terms of industry, stage and 
location.
In addition, because venture capital firms usually receive 20 percent of the fund’s capital gain 
but do not share the possible losses, original investors must protect themselves against 
opportunistic behavior. They usually limit the fund’s upper bound investment size, in a way 
that no more than 10 percent of the fund’s capital can be invested in one portfolio company. 
Occasionally, a promising company could require such a large amount of capital that this limit 
might inhibit the venture capital firm to invest in it without syndication. Thus, syndication 
allows VCFs to participate in larger deals than they could invest by themselves. The 
subreasons relating to spreading of financial risk are summarized below.
H9a: syndication enables VCFs to invest in a greater number of different
venture stages
H9b: syndication enables VCFs to invest in a greater number of different
industries
H9c: syndication enables VCFs to invest in companies within a broader
geographic scope
H9d: syndication is a means of reducing company specific risk because it
allows VCFs to invest in a greater number of similar companies
H9e: syndication allows VCFs to participate in larger deals (e.g. fund limits,
minority-holding rule).
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4.7.2. Information Sharing
Larson suggests that a key goal of the entrepreneur is to build network exchange structures 
with outsiders, who are identified as critical resource suppliers102. A venture capitalist may 
provide access to important networks, which a company would otherwise find difficult to 
penetrate. Access to these networks significantly increases the possibility of successful 
development because they provide information resources and market outlets for 
distribution103. Thus, venture capital firms may wish to broaden their network of contacts by 
со-investing and establishing relationships with other venture capital firms.
H10a: Syndication enables VCFs to build industry specific networks and
contacts.
Robert Drummond, a venture capitalist, says that syndication ensures venture capitalists a 
large supply of deals or deal flow. He believes that by building a network of like-minded 
investors, he is less likely to miss a good investment opportunity, because also his partners are 
looking for investments. However, some venture capitalists want everything for themselves 
once they think they have found a good investment opportunity. 104 As one common joke 
among venture capitalists says it ”Good deals don't flow”.
HlOb: Syndication enables VCFs to obtain future deal flow from the
syndicated partners.
Sah and Stiglitz show in their study that it may be more efficient to undertake only those 
projects, which are approved by two independent reviewers, instead of undertaking all 
projects approved by just either one of the reviewers105. Therefore, if two venture capitalists 
can to some degree independently evaluate the business and if they will go forward with the 
deal only if they both agree that the company is worth of investing. This unanimous decision­
making procedure might result in better decisions than they could make on their own.
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HIOc: Two venture capitalists from different venture capital firms can together
make a better investment decision than just one.
Because institutional investors examine the venture organizations' track record, offering 
documents of investments in successful companies, often not clarifying whether the venture 
capitalists was an early or late investor, it might be beneficial for a venture capital firm to 
invest in a promising firm shortly before it goes public, even if the financial return itself is 
low106. Lemer has found that when established venture capital firms join as new investors in 
later rounds, the portfolio company's valuation has often experienced a sharp increase prior 
the investment.107 Thus,
HlOd: VCFs want to be part of success stories, and therefore make later round
syndicated investments in well performing companies.
Since venture capital firms need to raise additional funds to stay in business, marketing and 
public relations are likely to play an important role in this fund raising process. Thus, venture 
capital firms may syndicate because
HlOe: Syndication has public relations value and VCFs want their company
name to be attached to as many deals as possible.
Finally, due diligence process as well as monitoring portfolio companies is time consuming. 
The time spent in due diligence and post-investment activities is likely to be at least partially 
independent of the size of the investment. It follows that the cost of time is an especially 
important factor in relatively small size investments. However, if the lead investor can do the 
due diligence and monitoring for other investors, syndication can reduce the total time put 
into the venture.
HlOf: Syndication is an efficient way to invest in smaller deals because it
reduces the amount of work needed to evaluate the proposal and to 
assist the company personally.
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4.7.3. Discussion
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If syndication is only to reduce financial risk then we need to ask can the venture capitalist do 
it more efficiently than what the original investor would. Because original investors have the 
possibility to invest in different venture capital funds, they are capable of making 
”homemade” syndication. Only if the institutional investors are not able to replicate the 
syndications at no greater costs, will VCFs be rewarded from making syndicated investments.
Furthermore, although syndication enables a VCF to diversify its portfolio, it may make 
portfolio diversification more difficult for an institutional investor. An institutional investor 
may believe he has diversified his venture capital funds by investing in several different 
funds. If these funds syndicate often, the end result may be that the institutional investor 
winds up having his money in only a few portfolio companies. It follows that from the 
institutional investors’ point of view, a more desirable reason for the existence of syndication 
is likely to be the sharing of information. The sharing of information is likely to increase 
VCFs’ potential to add value in the portfolio company. Hence, I hypothesize
H10: The most important reason for venture capital firms to syndicate is to
share information.
4.7.4. Related Issues
According to Bygrave (1987 & 1988), venture capitalists will со-invest with such venture 
capitalists, which are likely to add value to the investment108. This argument is easy to make 
but hard to test empirically. Hence, I will not measure it in my research.
Lemer’s109 results are consistent with Admati and P fielder’s constant equity share hypothesis. 
The hypothesis states that those venture capitalists, who already own shares of the portfolio 
company, will maintain the same stake of the company in subsequent financing rounds to 
avoid the problems arising from asymmetric information110. The old investors have an 
information advantage over the new investors, and have an incentive to over- or understate the 
proper value of the company. Only when the old investors maintain their current stake of the
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company, will they be indifferent to the valuation of the company. Lemer argues that this 
implies that later-round financing must be syndicated111. I cannot see the logic in his 
argument. I acknowledge that when syndication takes place, it makes sense that the old 
owners keep their previous share of the company. However, there would seem to be no clear 
reason why the previous owners could not invest only by themselves in the next financial 
round. The reason that new investors are joining the portfolio company is likely to be due to 
venture capitalists investment strategies. For example, as the company grows, VCFs focusing 
on late venture stages may want to invest in the company. This may provide an exit for the 
early stage investor.
Lemer found that in the first round, established venture capital firms, measured by age and 
committed capital, tend to syndicate with one another. Accordingly, small size venture capital 
firms syndicate with other small size venture capital firms. However, with each subsequent 
round this pattern becomes less distinct. He also found that less established venture capital 
firms syndicate in later rounds. The new investors in the later rounds tend to be smaller in 
term of committed capital, younger, and less experienced, in terms of number of investments, 
than the previous venture investors. Lemer argues that the results are consistent with the view 
that syndication allows venture capitalists to obtain information in order to make better 
investment decisions.112 Lemer also recognized that financial risk sharing is another important 
reason for syndication, but he did not in his study examine its influence on syndication113.
4.7.5. Characteristics of Loosely and Tightly Coupled Networks
Now that we know that the US venture capital industry is loosely coupled* overall, but that the 
top firms, especially high-tech venture capital firms, are more intensively connected among 
themselves, we can discuss the benefits and disadvantages from being part of a tightly coupled 
network.
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* loosely coupled network means that the connectedness of the network is low
In a tightly coupled system, external influence can affect the entire system because 
information flows quickly through many channels. Members of the tightly coupled system 
may have uniform behavior. It may be very difficult for an entrepreneur to receive financing, 
if one of the network members has turned his proposal down. For example, the chances of 
obtaining other venture capital for companies, from which previous venture capitalists had 
denied follow-on financing, reduced by 74 percent.114
A loosely coupled system has the disadvantage of slow communication, but can bring new 
information to the system. To ensure fresh information to the network, top firms syndicate 
also with outside members. Another advantage of the loosely coupled system is the 
diversification effect. Industry and life-stage diversification moderates the ups and downs of 
the whole industry.115
Aside from that syndication may make portfolio diversification more difficult from an 
institutional investor’s perspective, all other issues of syndication have been positive. There 
are, however, some potential pitfalls in syndication, which I briefly mention in the next 
paragraph.
Steier et al. found out in a case study, that syndication could result in delays in later stage 
financing due to bureaucracy in the decision-making procedures. Each of the original 
investors was involved at each stage and had to make decisions on how much to invest. This 
naturally requires information collection and assessment, which in turn is time-consuming. 
The company ended up getting the money later than planned, because when one investor was 
behind the schedule it delayed the whole project.116
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This chapter briefly summarizes the hypotheses presented in the previous chapters and 
introduces the initial model.
Figure 7 Initial model
Hla: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a more diverse set of industries 
than other venture capital firms.
Hlb: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a less diverse set of industries 
than other venture capital firms.
H2a: Venture capitalists seek to control unsystematic liquidity risk will lead
them to diversify across several different venture stages.
H2b: The venture capitalists ’ strategy to specialize in order to enhance their
position in networks and information sharing flows will lead them to 
concentrate in one financing stage or several financing stages, which 
may be related by virtue of subsequent follow-on investments.
H3a: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a narrower geographic scope 
than other venture capital firms.
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H3b: Venture capital firms that invest within a less diverse set of industries
will look for investment opportunities within a broader geographic 
scope than other venture capital firms
H4a: Venture capital firm with a larger pool of capital under management
will prefer venture investments within a more diverse set of industries 
than other venture capital firms.
H4b: Venture capital firm with a larger pool of capital under management
will prefer venture investments within a broader geographic scope than 
other venture capital firms.
H5a: Venture capital firm with public sources of funds will prefer a less
diverse set of industries (focusing on high-tech industries) than other 
venture capital firms.
H5b: Venture capital firm with public sources offunds will prefer more early
stage ventures than other venture capital firms.
H6a Venture capital firms with more resources of capital have a lower
degree of connectedness than those venture capital firms with smaller 
capital resources.
H6b Venture capital firms with better availability of prospective investments
have a lower degree of connectedness.
H7a Venture capital firms within a more concentrated group, measured by
capital invested, have a higher degree of propensity to invest among 
themselves.
H7b Venture capital firms located in Helsinki have a higher degree of
propensity to invest among themselves.
H8a: Venture capital firms focusing on early stage companies have a higher
degree of connectedness than those venture capital firms investing in 
more mature ventures.
H8b: Venture capital firms focusing on high-tech companies have a higher
degree of connectedness than those venture capital firms that invest in 
low-tech ventures.
H10: The most important reason for venture capital firms to syndicate is to
share information.
6. Data and Methodology
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This chapter presents the methodology and descriptive analysis of both Finnish and Israeli 
samples. The descriptive analysis is presented in parallel for the two sample countries in order 
to make the comparison easier to follow.
6.1. Data from Finnish and Israeli Venture Capital Firms’ 
Investment Preferences
The study sample from Finnish venture capital firm investment preferences was drawn from 
the Finnish Venture Capital Association’s booklet 1998117. Similarly, the Israeli data was 
obtained from the Israel Venture Association’s yearbook 19981'8. The sample therefore 
represents well the whole venture capital industry in both countries. In Finland, the 
investment preferences were given for each venture capital firm, whereas in Israel, the 
investment preferences were given for each fund. This has to be kept in mind when 
interpreting direct comparisons of the results. Notice also that from this point on I will use the 
term VCF to represent an Israeli venture capital fund as well as a Finnish venture capital firm.
The two samples are compared using the two sample median test with Yates’ continuity 
correction. Another possible test would have been the mean test. The non-parametric median 
test was chosen because it is more robust in situation where the normality assumption might 
be violated.119
6.1.1. Variable Operationalization
This chapter presents the operationalization of the variables.
There are 30 VCFs in Finland, from which 11 are public-related and 19 are privately owned. 
In Israel, however, the vast majority of VCFs is private and only a few are public-related. 
Therefore, I will only use the ownership type as a variable for the Finnish data. I coded the 
variable type of the VCF as follows: public=0; private=l
Preferences regarding venture stage diversification is measured by the number of different 
venture stages. In Finland, there are five different possible venture stages defined as seed,
117 Finnish Venture Capital Association, 1998. Directory of members 1998. pp 1-56
118 Israel Venture Association. “IVA 1998 Yearbook”. 1998. Edited by Giza Group.
119 Ghauri, P, Gronhaug, K, Kristianlund, I. 1995 Research Methods in Business Studies. Prentice Hall. New 
York, pp 106-108
start-up, expansion, buy-outs, and turnaround. The venture stages in Israel were defined as 
incubation, seed, start-up, other early-stage, expansion/development, and mezzanine/bridge*. 
It follows, that the variable preferred stage diversification varies between 1 and 5 for the 
Finnish sample and between 1 and 6 for the Israeli sample. As can be seen from Figure 8, the 
extent of preferred venture stage diversification seems to be quite similar in both countries - 
most of the VCFs are looking for investing in two to four different venture stages. However, 
Finnish VCFs seem to be a little less diversified across venture stages, but the median Chi- 
square test reveals that the difference is insignificant (p=0,189).
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Preferred Stage diversifications
Figure 8 Comparison of the preferred venture stage diversification of venture capital 
firms across the two samples
To measure whether a VCF is looking for investing in an early or late stage venture, I needed 
to calculate a variable that would measure the preferred venture stage of the company. I call 
this variable the preferred stage index. Because the VCFs only list the preferred venture 
stages, I decided to give equal weight to each stage. For the Finnish sample, I calculated the 
variable preferred stage index as the sum of venture stages divided by the number of different
* At the beginning, there was also a stage called “secondary investments in venture capital funds”, which I 
eliminated from the data because I was unable to determine this secondary fund, and therefore, also the venture 
stage. For example, if the fund in which secondary investment is placed would focus on the same venture stages 
as the original fund itself, the secondary investment would not affect venture stage diversification. It should be 
noted that this elimination does not affect the reliability of the data, since there were only three VCFs in Finland 
and one in Israel that stated making such investments.
venture stages, where the stages were given the following coding: seed=0; start-up=l; 
expansion=2; MB0=3 bridge=4; tumaround=4. Similarly, I calculated the corresponding 
variable for Israel, where the venture stages were given the following coding: incubation=0; 
seed=0; start-up=l; other early-stage=2; expansion/development =3; mezzanine/bridge=4. As 
a result, both variables vary between 0 and 4. As the Figure 9 suggests, Israeli venture capital 
funds are quite evenly spread across the spectrum, 17 funds (23 percent) having a venture 
stage index between 0,5 and 1, that is, seed and start up. In contrast, Finnish VCFs seem to be 
highly concentrated on venture stages between 2 and 2,5, that is, expansion and buy-outs. 
However, the median Chi-square test reveals no significant difference in the preferred venture 
stage index between the countries (p=0,795).
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Stage Focus
Figure 9 Comparison of the venture stage index of venture capital firms across the two 
samples
To measure the extent to which a VCF is willing to diversify its investments across industries, 
I used a similar measure to that of preferred stage diversification. I simply counted the number 
of industries in which a VCF stated it preferred to invest. A similar measure was used in 
Gupta and Sapienza (1992). If the VCF stated that it had no industry preference, a number 18 
was given. Thus, the variable preferred industry diversification varies between 1 and 18 in 
both samples. As can be seen from Figure 10, 22 out of the 30 (73,3%) Finnish VCFs reported 
no industry preference, whereas the corresponding number in Israel is only 24,3%. Indeed,
median Chi-square test reveals that Israeli VC funds prefer significantly less industry 
diversification than their Finnish counter-partners do (p=0,017).
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Preferred industry diversification
Intended Industry diversification (number of stated industries; no industry preference^8)
Figure 10 Comparison of the preferred industry diversification of venture capital firms 
across the two samples
VCFs also stated their preferences concerning the geographic scope, from where they are 
looking for portfolio investments. The variable preferred geographic scope, which measures 
the preferences regarding the portfolio company’s location was coded for the Finnish sample 
as follows: local=0; national=l; Nordic/Baltic=2; EU/Eastem Europe=3; Asia/US=4. 
Similarly, Israeli venture capital funds stated their geographic preferences. However, no fund 
stated that it preferred local investments only - ‘Israel only’ being the narrowest scope. This is 
probably because there was not an alternative for such a preference in the list. The variable 
preferred geographic scope is coded for the Israeli sample as follows: Israel only=l; Israel 
and Israel related=2; Israel and other geographical locations=3; Japan/Taiwan/US=4. Thus, 
the Finnish variable varies between 0 and 4, whereas the Israeli variable varies only between 1 
and 4. As a result, a direct comparison of the preferred geographic scope is not adequate. In 
Finland there seems to be a clear trend in which the number of VCFs decreases as the 
geographic scope increases. In Israel, the vast majority of venture capital funds prefer to 
invest in Israel or Israeli related companies. I did not use statistical measures to compare the 
two samples because of the difference in coding the variables.
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Preferred Geographic Scope
Flnland:0=local;1=Flnland;2=Nordlc/Baltic;3=Europe;4=US/Asla  
lsrael:1 =lsrael only;2=lsrael and Israel related, 3-lsrael and other geographical locations;4=US/Asia
X Israel
Figure 11 Comparison of the preferred geographic diversification of venture capital 
firms across the two samples
In addition to the information above, there are some straightforward variables, which are 
briefly listed below:
• age of the venture capital fund is the months since fund’s establishment.
• capital available for investments equals the difference between the amount of fund 
capital and the amount of capital invested
• capital under management is the VCF’s capital under management. Israeli VCFs 
reported all investment in US Dollars, which were changed to FIM by multiplying 
by 5.
• number of employees in the VCF
• number of portfolio companies in the fund
• Amount of Fund capital is the amount of capital of the Israeli VC funds (millions 
of FIM)
• preferred maximum investment
• preferred minimum investment
• number of portfolio companies in the VCF. Notice that the number of portfolio 
companies the VCF manages is always less or equal to the sum of portfolio 
companies in its funds, because the VCF may have made internal syndications.
• typical investment size reported by the Finnish VCFs
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics from the Finnish venture capital industry. 
Corresponding statistics from Israel are presented in Table 2.
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Amount of average investment 
(millions FIM)
28 2 31,60 3 74,72 0,3 375
Capital under management (millions 
FÏM)
28 2 630,65 142,5 1232,36 9,426 6000
Number of employees in the VCF 29 1 8,31 4 10,17 1 45
Preferred stage index 28 2 2,16 2 0,59 0,5 3
Preferred geographic scope 30 0 1,63 1 1,45 0 4
Preferred industry diversification 30 0 14,60 18 5,72 1 18
Amount of capital invested (millions 
Г1М)
Preferred stage diversification
24 6 270,71 55 614,42 2,8 3000
28 2 3,00 3 1,05 1 5
Type of VCF 30 0 0,63 1 0,49 0 1
Amount of minimum investment
(millions FIM)
25 5 9,46 1 30,06 0,09 150










Amount of capital available (millions 40 43 103,43 67,5 126,12 0 500
FIM)
Amount of capital under ^ 54
management (millions FIM)
Age of the fund (months) | 69
29 225,09 125 251,05 20 1375
14 40,80 39,6 30,11 5,1 147
Amount of fund capital (millions í?; 73 10 177,10 110 216,82 17,5 1375
FIM)
Number of portfolio companies in 54 29 12,13 9 9,93 2 48
the fund
Preferred geographic scope ''JsS 77 6 2,05 2 0,63 1 4
Preferred industry diversification 74 9 11,16 11 4,94 1 18
Amount of maximum investment 55 28 15,45 10 12,21 2,5 55
(millions FIM)
Amount of minimum . 54 29 2,44 2,5 1,92 0 10
investment(millions FIM)
Preferred stage diversification ,;í 75
Preferred stage index Щ 73
8 3,43 3 1,41 1 6
10 1,90 2 1,07 0 4
Number of portfolio companies the 47 36 13,81 11 10,57 3 48
VCF has in its portfolio
Number of employees in the VCF 48 35 4,73 4 2,30 2 13
6.2. Da ta from Finnish and Israeli Por tfolio Investments
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the data from actual portfolio investments. 
Variable operationalization is also presented. From Finland, I have the following information 
on every investment in the VCFs’ portfolio by the end of years 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997:
• name of the venture capital fund,
• name of the portfolio company,
• ownership percentage of the portfolio company,
• industry in which the portfolio company operates,
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• state in which the portfolio company is located in Finland, or if it is located 
abroad,
• year when the fund initially invested in the portfolio company,
• number of employees in the portfolio company, and
• sales of the portfolio company.
From Israel I have unfortunately less data. I have only the names of the portfolio companies 
and their industries for every venture capital fund. The portfolio investments are taken from 
spring 1998.
Matching names of the portfolio companies in which at least two different VCFs have 
invested, reveals the external syndications. Similarly, matching the portfolio company names 
in which at least two separate funds managed by the same VCF have invested, reveals the 
internal syndications. The information of the initial investment year enables me to find out 
later-round syndications in Finland. Appendix 2 present the matrix, which contains the 
number of direct links between the Israeli venture capital firms. The corresponding Finnish 
matrix is confidential.
6.2.1. Variable Operationalization
Actual number of portfolio companies is the number of different portfolio companies in which 
the Finnish VCF has invested. In Israel, the variable represents the number of different 
portfolio companies in which an Israeli venture capital fund has invested. It should be noted 
that this measure differs from the number of investments, since an internal syndication 
accounts for a multiple investment but for only one different portfolio company. There was no 
significant difference between the countries in the number of portfolio companies held by 
venture capital firms (p=0,797). Figure 12 shows the distribution of the actual number of 
portfolio companies in the sample countries.
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Accululated distribution of the number of portfolio companies
Number of portfolio companies
Figure 12 Comparison the number of portfolio companies managed by the VCFs across 
the two samples
To measure actual investment diversification, I could have used the variable number of 
different industries, which simply counts the number of different industries in which the VCF 
has investments. The advantage of this measure would have been its good comparability with 
the preferred industry diversification variable, since both would have been calculated the 
same way.
However, because there are many VCFs that have so far placed only a few investments, and 
because the number of portfolio companies restricts the number of possible industries, the 
variable number of different industries is likely to lack explanatory power. This can be seen 
from the high correlation between the number of different industries and the actual number of 
portfolio companies (Finland 0,825; p=0,000; Israel 0,713; p=0,000).
The variable number of different industries does not take into account the relative number of 
portfolio companies in different industries. For example, a VCF having 20 investment in one 
industry and one investment in five other industries, would receive the same measure as 
another VCF, which has five investments in each of its six industries. Clearly, the first VCF is 
more industry-focused.
One way to overcome this problem is to give weight to the industries according to the number 
of portfolio companies in each industry. Because no information on investment sizes was
available, I made the assumption that the investments are of equal size, and simply gave 
weights to the industries according to the number of investments. The variable, industry HHI, 
is the Herfmdahl-Hirschman index, which measures the industry diversification, and is 
calculated as follows:
Equation 6 Industry Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index
Сц ”
HHI - *I2_j Ci ’ where Ci is the percent of portfolio companies in industry i and
n is the number of industries.
In this study, the variable industry HHI is used as the measure of actual industry 
diversification. Because there are 21 industries used by the Finnish Venture Capital 
Association, the HHI could, in theory, vary between 21,8 and 100 in Finland. Similarly, 
because there are 18 industries used by the Israeli Venture Association, the HHI could, in 
theory, vary between 23,6 and 100 in Israel. Figure 13 illustrates the distribution of actual 
industry diversification. There is not a significant difference between the countries in terms of 
actual industry diversification (p=0,797). In order to take into account the restriction the 
number of portfolio companies poses on industry diversification, I chose to eliminate those 
VCFs, which had made only one portfolio investment. As a result, two VCFs were eliminated 
from the Finnish sample and one from the Israeli sample.
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Accumulated distribution on VCFs according to actual Industry diversification (HH-index)
Figure 13 Comparison of industry diversification HH-index across the two samples
To measure the degree of investment in high-tech industries by a VCF, I calculated the 
variable, percent of high-tech companies, which is the percent of portfolio companies 
operating in the following industries:
communications, biotechnology, computer-related industry, other electronics-related 
industry, medical/health-related industry, or industrial automation, and software
Figure 14 presents the general distribution of invested capital by industries in US, Finland, 
Israel and Europe. The Israeli venture capital industry seems to be technology-oriented 
compared to Europe and Finland. The ratio of capital invested in high-tech in Israel, is three 
times that in Finland. A median Chi-square test reveals that Israeli venture capital funds have, 
indeed, made significantly more investments in high-tech industries than Finnish VCFs
(p=0,000).
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Percent of capital invested by industries
country
Figure 14 Comparison of the percent of capital invested in some high-tech industries in 
US, Israel, Finland, and Europe.
Source: Money Tree Survey, IVA yearbook 1998, and Pääomasijoittaminen Suomessa 1997, Coopers & Lybrand, The Economic Impact of 
Venture Capital in Europe
The absolute number of со-investing by a firm is likely to depend on its size - in other words - 
the larger the firm, the more investments it has made, and the more syndications it has. Hence, 
it is important to measure the degree of со-investing of one VCF relative to another firm, in a 
way that eliminates the size effect. The variable propensity to syndicate measures the VCF’s
propensity to syndicate and is calculated by dividing the total number of external syndication 
investments by the total number of investments. Hence, it can be thought of as a probability of 
an investment being syndicated. Figure 15 shows the ratio of externally and internally 
syndicated investments, sole investments, and the sum of direct links in Israel and in Finland. 
These ratios are calculated by dividing the corresponding number by the number of VCFs’ 
investments*. Median Chi-square test shows that Israeli VC funds have a significantly higher 
propensity to syndicate than Finnish VCFs (p=0,000). It should be noted that the reason there 
appears to be no later-round syndications in Israel is not because there are no such 
investments, but because I was unable to obtain such information.
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Degree and types of Syndications in Finland and Israel in relation to VCF investment
(VCF investment is counted as one even if several funds under the same management company have 
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Figure 15 Comparison of the percentages of external syndication, internal syndication, 
later-round syndication, sole investments, and direct links of VCF across the two 
samples
Figure 16 shows the distribution of the number of syndication partners in Finland and in 
Israel. In almost all cases, Finnish VCFs have syndicated with only one other VCF, whereas 
syndication involving several parties is common in Israel. The average number of partners 
involved in syndication is in Israel 2,9 and in Finland 2,1.
* It should be noted that the number of investment differs from VCFs’ investments because investments by 
different funds under same management company are counted as one VCF investment.
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number of partners
Figure 16 Comparison of the number of syndication partners across the two samples
6.2.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Venture Capital Firms’ Portfolio Investments
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics from the Finnish venture capital industry. 
Corresponding statistics from Israel are presented in Table 4.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the Finnish portfolio investment data
N Valid Mean Median Std. Deviation Mi ni mu
m
Maximum
Number of portfolio companies in the 22 16,82 11,00 20,74 2,00 93,00
VCF
Number of different industries in which 22 6,45 5,50 4,23 2,00 14,00
the VCF has invested
Industry HHI 22 53,63 51,37 15,20 31,49 83,81
Percent of high-tech companies in the 22 40,60 33,33 25,91 0,00 100,00
VCF
Propensity to syndicate 22 0,22 0,12 0,29 0,00 1,00
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the Israeli portfolio investment data
N Valid Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum *
Number of portfolio companies in the 48 12,02 9,00 10,11 2,00 49,00
fund
Number of different industries in which 48 4,69 4,00 2,12 1,00 11,00
the fund has invested
Industry HHI 48 57,08 54,07 13,59 38,67 100,00
Percent of high-tech companies in the 48 88,57 96,66 19,87 0,00 100,00
fund
Propensity to syndicate 48 0,58 0,61 0,28 0,00 1,00
6.2.3. Portfolio Investment Level Variables
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This subchapter discusses first the opetarionalization of the variables associated with portfolio 
investment data. It also presents the descriptive statistics of the data of both countries.
External syndication is coded 1 if the investment is syndicated with another VCF, otherwise it 
is 0.
Internal syndication is coded 1 if the investment is syndicated among another fund within the 
management company, otherwise it is 0. It should be noted that one portfolio investment can 
be, and quite often is, both externally and internally syndicated.
A High-tech company is coded 1 if the company operates in one of the high-tech industries 
mentioned in the previous chapter.
Portfolio company’s proximity to VCFs office is coded 0, when the portfolio company is 
located in the same Finnish state as the VCF. Portfolio company’s proximity to VCFs office 
equals 1 if the portfolio company is located in another Finnish state than the VCF’s office. In 
case the portfolio company is located outside Finland, the variable is given a value of 2. This 
variable could only be calculated for the Finnish sample.
Type of VCF is coded in the same way as previously (public=0;private=l) and is calculated 
only for the Finnish sample.
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the Finnish portfolio investment data
Finland N N Mean Median Std. Minimum Maximum
Valid Miss Deviation
ing
Year of data 406 0 1997,07 1997,00 0,25 1997 1998
Number of employees in the 
portfolio company
365 41 97,20 15,00 341,30 1 2900




Portfolio company’s proximity to















406 0 0,48 0,00 0,58 0 2
VCFs office
Later round syndication 406 0 0,07 0,00 0,25 0 1
Percent of ownership 322 84 27,10 25,00 15,72 1 100
Annual sales (millions FIM) 371 35 81,85 9,00 363,68 0 6320
Type of VCF 406 0 0,42 0,00 0,49 0 1
External syndication is coded 1 =external syndication 0=not externally syndicated. Internal syndication is coded 1 if the investment is 
syndicated among another fund within the management company, otherwise it is 0. A High-tech company is coded I if the company 
operates in one of the high-tech industries, otherwise 0. Portfolio company’s proximity to VCFs office is coded (0= same Finnish state;I= 
another Finnish state 2= outside Finland. Type of VCF is coded (public=0;private=l).
Chapter 6 Data and Methodology 60
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of the Israeli portfolio investment data




Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
High-tech company 578 0 1 0,9135 0,2814
Internal syndication 580 0 1 5,172E-02 0,2217
Externa] syndication 580 0 1 0,6276 0,4839
External syndication is coded l=external syndication 0=not externally syndicated. Internal syndication is coded ! if the investment is 
syndicated among another fund within the management company, otherwise it is 0. A High-tech company is coded I if the company 
operates in one of the high-tech industries, otherwise 0.
6.2.4. Research methods
To further analyze whether the dominant reason to syndicate has to do with spreading of 
financial risk or with information sharing, I will use the data from the questionnaire shown in 
appendix 1. This is a new methodological approach to gain information on the reasons for 
syndication. Asking venture capitalists directly for the motives for syndication, allows me to 
study factors that would be hard to measure empirically. In addition, I can validate venture 
capitalists’ arguments for syndication by measuring how industry, company, venture stage, 
and geographic diversification affects syndication patterns according to the actual portfolio 
investment data.
6.3. Questionnaire
All 30 members of the Finnish Venture Capital Association were sent a questionnaire shown 
in appendix 1. The same questionnaire was sent to 40 Israeli VCFs that were classified either 
as a private equity company, or a VCF. The questionnaire was not translated into Finnish to 
avoid methodological problems with translations. Annareetta Lumme, a venture capitalist, 
who has published articles on venture capital, reviewed the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was sent to one respondent in every firm - most often to the president.
The questionnaire was accompanied by a letter that briefly explained the purpose of the study 
and ensured the confidentiality of the information provided. The respondents were promised a 
summary of the results as an incentive to fill in the questionnaire. In Finland, the 
questionnaire was sent a second time to the non-respondents and a follow-up telephone call 
was carried out to remind non-respondents. Unfortunately, no follow-up procedure was done 
in Israel due to the project’s time and capital constraints.
From Finland, the total response rate was 73% (22/30) and from Israel 28% (11/40). The 
Finnish response rate is especially high, because out of the eight non-respondents two are
foreign VCFs, which operate only on low scale in Finland (Euroventures, Industri Kapital). 
Two other funds reported that their investment behavior is on most part not venture capital, 
and wanted to stay out of the study (Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy, Norvestia Oy). Moreover, 
one fund is not investing anymore (Sadepo Oy). It follows that only three suitable Finnish 
venture capital firms did not reply to the questionnaire. Hence, the respondents represent well 
the overall Finnish venture capital industry. Unfortunately, the same argument does not apply 
to Israel. In addition, quite many of the replies were not completely filled, which resulted in 
missing data.
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7. Results and Discussion
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7.1. Specializa tion versus Diversifica tion
This chapter deepens the analysis of the empirical data. First, the results of testing the 
hypotheses regarding VCFs’ portfolio diversification are presented. The chapter ends with a 
regression analysis and a discussion of the results.
7.1.1. Results Relating to the Circular Model of Diversification
Figure 17 presents the expected relationships of the circular model of diversification. All four 
measures are expected to be interdependent. The signs next to the arrows indicate the 
expected positive or negative relationship between the variables.
Figure 17 Circular model of diversification
The two tables in Appendix 3 summarize the tau-b correlation coefficients between the 
variables relating to the circular model of diversification for the two sample countries. Both 
tables suggest that the variables of the model are, indeed, interdependent. In order to separate 
the true effects of the variables on each other, I will use partial correlation analysis, which 
allows me to control for the other two variables120. These partial correlation coefficients are 
presented in Table 7 and in Table 8.
120 Ghauri, P, Gronhaug, K, Kristianlund, I. 1995 Research Methods in Business Studies. Prentice Hall. New 
York, p 37
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Table 7 Partial correlation coefficients between the construct relating to diversification 
for the Finnish sample
Finland Capital under 
management
Preferred stage index Preferred geographic scop
Preferred stage index ,3550
sig ,074
Preferred geographic ,6651** -,3049
scope sig ,001 sig ,109
Industry HHI -,5434** ,6207** ,4838*
sig ,010 sig ,003 sig ,021
Preferred industry ,2423 -,2636 -,1336
diversification sig ,127 sig ,107 sig ,267
Controlled for capital under management, preferred geographic scope, preferred stage index, and industry HHI
Table 8 Partial correlation coefficients between the construct relating to diversification
for the Israeli sample
Israel Amount of fund 
capital
Preferred stage index Preferred geographic scope




scope sig. ,018 sig. ,408
Industry HHI -0,2638 -0,2874 ,2543
sig. ,069 sig. ,052 sig. ,077
Preferred industry 0,0916 ,4840** -,1906
diversification sig. ,241 sig. ,000 sig. ,071
Controlled for the amount offund capital. Preferred geographic scope, preferred stage index, and preferred industry diversification *
7.1.2. Results Relating to Venture Stage and Industry Diversification
For Finland, as the tau-b correlation coefficients suggested, there is a significant relationship 
between the VCFs’ preferred stage index and industry diversification. This relationship is 
even stronger, when we control for the capital under management and preferred geographic 
scope. The negative relationship between industry diversification and the stage index seems to 
be the case both in preferred investment strategies and in practice, but tends to be stronger in 
practice. Later venture stage index implies industry focus rather than industry diversification 
in Finland. These results are in conformity with the portfolio theory and support the 
hypothesis HI a.
* Using the preferred industry diversification as a control variable has two advantages. First, it provides more
data points. Second, it is consistent to use the preferred industry diversification along with the other variables, 
which are also based on investment preferences. However, for Finland, industry HHI was used as the control 
variable, because the variable ‘preferred industry diversification’ has a low variance. 73 percent of the Finnish 
VCFs have no industry preferences.
In the Israeli sample, the results are very different from the Finnish results. Those venture 
capital funds, which stated that they prefer to invest in late stage ventures also stated that they 
prefer to diversify across a large number of different industries. Hence, intended strategies of 
the Israeli venture capital funds are in line with the specialization hypothesis. These intended 
strategies seem to only partially be realized, as actual investment data shows not as strong 
relationship between the preferred stage index and actual industry diversification (p=0,052). 
This may be partially due to the youth of the venture capital industry, where young funds may 
not have had enough time to realize their intended strategies. Nevertheless, I interpret these 
results in favor of the specialization hypothesis Hlb.
There are several possibilities why Finland and Israel differ dramatically regarding venture 
stage and industry diversification. First, the industry categories are more general in Finland 
than in Israel, which should lead to lower industry diversification in Finland. However, the 
previous results showed that this is not the case, and the Finnish VCFs are, in fact, more 
diversified across industries. Second, Finnish VCFs are much more concentrated regarding 
their preferred stage index - concentrating on expansion and buy-outs stages - as shown in 
Figure 9. Hence, the results may be sensitive to those companies representing either early or 
late stage - for example SFK Finance and Sitra, which have well diversified portfolios, yet 
focus on early stage. Third, private VCFs investing in the late stage have invested largely in 
general industries, such as consumer-related, and industrial production and services, which 
both count as one single industry in this research.
The fourth and most probable reason for the difference between Israel and Finland is related 
to the percentages of companies in high-tech industries. Recall that the percentage of high- 
tech companies was nearly twice as much, and the amount of capital invested in high-tech 
nearly three times as much in Israel as in Finland. In addition, the data suggest that those 
VCFs investing in early stage have a larger propensity to invest in a high-tech industry. The 
percentage of high-tech companies is negatively correlated with preferred stage index in 
Israel, when industry diversification, capital under management and geographic scope are 
controlled for (p=0,055). Although the sign of the correlation coefficients is the same in 
Finland as in Israel, high-tech would seem to not significantly affect preferred stage index 
(p=0,297). In summary, these results suggest that the cost of gaining knowledge in high-tech 
industries is higher than in low-tech industries.
Fifth, perhaps the most interesting, explanation for the difference relates to post-investment 
activities. Recall that the portfolio theory suggested that those VCFs focusing on the early
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stage ventures, that is, more risky investments, ought to be more diversified than VCFs that 
invest in late stage ventures, all other things the same. Hence, the Finnish results are in line 
with the portfolio theory. An underlying assumption was that the VCFs are more or less acting 
as passive investors and are not adding value in their portfolio companies. It follows that the 
Finnish VCFs, which focus on early stage, would seem to believe they are not able to add 
sufficiently value to their portfolio companies to compensate the additional risk associated 
with the early stage investment.
7.1.3. Geographic Scope
In the Finnish sample, when we control for stage index and capital under management, the 
partial correlation between industry HHI and preferred geographic scope is significant at 2,1% 
confidence level. This finding is in conformity with the hypothesis H3b.
However, the correlation between the preferred geographic scope and preferred stage index is 
negative at 11% confidence level, when I control for capital under management and industry 
HHI. Thus, there is not clear support for the hypothesis H3a on the VCF level. Interestingly, 
when I study individual portfolio investments, early stage ventures seem to be closer to the 
VCF’s office than later stage ventures. This result is taken from the significant positive 
correlation between portfolio company’s proximity to VCFs office, and the number of 
employees in the portfolio company (p=0,000; N=365). This implies that larger ventures tend 
to be further from the VCFs office than smaller ventures. Hence, all though there is no clear 
evidence on the VCF level that early stage ventures are closer to the VCFs office, it can be 
argued that this occurs on an investment by investment basis.
In Israel, the initial results from tau-b correlation suggest that those venture capital funds 
focusing on early stage would look for their portfolio companies within a narrower scope as 
expected. However, the relation is not significant (p=0,077) and when I control for either 
actual or preferred industry diversification and capital under management, the correlation 
coefficient becomes clearly insignificant (p=0,246/p=0,408). Therefore, I reject the hypothesis 
H3a regarding Israel.
In the Israeli sample, as expected, industry diversification seems to be negatively related to 
the geographic scope. When capital under management and the preferred venture stage index 
are controlled for, correlation between preferred industry diversification and geographic scope 
is negative at a 7,1% confidence level. Moreover, actual industry diversification and
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geographic scope are also negatively correlated (p=0,077). These results give support to my 
hypothesis regarding industry-, and geographic diversification.
In the Israeli sample, preferred stage diversification would also seem to be negatively related 
with the preferred geographic scope. This result can be obtained from the statistically 
significant negative partial correlation between the preferred stage diversification and 
preferred geographic scope (p=0,052), when the amount of fund capital, preferred industry 
diversification, and preferred stage index are controlled for. For the Finnish sample the 
relationship between the geographic scope and stage diversification was insignificant.
In summary, geographic diversification seems to be a substitute rather than a complement for 
industry or venture stage diversification. There are at least two possible reasons for VCFs to 
do so. First, those VCFs, which have decided to focus on certain industries or venture stages, 
compensate the lack of industry or venture stage diversification by diversifying across broader 
geographic scope to reduce financial risk. Second, a broader geographic scope helps VCFs to 
maintaining a sufficient deal flow, and enables larger funds to be allocated on specific 
industries or venture stages.
7.1.4. Capital Under Management
In the Finnish sample, when I control for both the preferred stage index and the geographic 
scope, the correlation between capital under management and the actual industry 
diversification becomes positively significant (p=0,010). However, the relationship between 
preferred industry diversification and capital under management is not as strong as in actual 
investments. There are several possible explanations. First, the result may be due to a biased 
variable. The reader is reminded that the preferred industry diversification may be a biased 
measure because 73 percent of the Finnish VCFs stated that they had no industry preferences. 
Second, those VCFs with large capital under management are likely to face pressure to invest 
the capital somewhere. If there are not enough potential deals in the preferred industries, 
VCFs may be tempted to invest in other industries, even outside their preferred industry 
scope, in order to make a sufficient amount of portfolio investments.
Also, my other hypothesis receives strong support. Those VCFs with a large pool of capital 
under management prefer to operate in a broad geographic scope. Even when the 
preferred/actual industry diversification, and preferred stage index are controlled for, the 
correlation is significantly positive (p=0,013/0,001)
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In the Israeli sample, the Tau-b correlation coefficients suggest that both measures of industry 
diversification were significantly related to the amount of fund capital. However, when the 
geographic scope and the preferred stage index are controlled for, the correlation between 
actual industry diversification and the amount of fund capital reduces and is significant at 6,9 
percent confidence level. However, the partial correlation between the preferred industry 
diversification and amount of fund capital is clearly insignificant. Hence, the results give only 
weak support for the hypothesis H4a.
Partial correlation analysis reveals that the amount of fund capital is significantly positively 
related to preferred geographic scope (p=0,018), as hypothesized. The result supports 
hypothesis H4b.
Needless to say that because late stage ventures are larger the average investment size larger, 
and that venture capital funds concentrating on late stage ventures tend to have more capital 
under management.
Regression Analysis of Actual Industry Diversification
Now that I have examined the partial correlation coefficients between the variables in the 
circular model of diversification, I will deepen the analysis with a multiple linear regression 
analysis, which simultaneously takes into account several predicting variables. A multiple 
regression analysis is used to explain the influence of several independent variables on a 
dependent variable121. My aim is to explain the variables that affect actual industry 
diversification - that means that industry HHI is used as the dependent variable. Adjusted RA2 
is commonly used to measure the power of the model. The same independent variables that 
were used in the partial correlation analysis were also used in the regression analysis. In 
addition, the actual number of portfolio companies was initially added to the model, because it 
correlated significantly with the industry HHI, for the reasons discussed earlier. One 
assumption of the multiple linear regression model is the multivariate normality of the 
variables. To test normality, skewness and kurtosis of the distribution, and the one-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test were used. A couple of variables we transformed to achieve better 
conformance with the normality assumption. In appendix 4, the results from the normality
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121 Ghauri, P, Gronhaug, K, Kristianlund, I. 1995 Research Methods in Business Studies. Prentice Hall. New 
York, pp 114-116
tests of the original and of the transformed variables are summarized. I used the list-wise 
exclusion option in the SPSS® software package to exclude cases with missing data.
Tables 9 and 10 present the multiple regression models of actual industry diversification for 
Finland and Israel. The tables present regression models that consist of those variables that 
remained in the model because of significant correlation with the actual industry 
diversification. Hence, non-significant predictors were excluded from the model. A stepwise 
procedure was used to calculate the regression in order to reduce the risk of instability due to 
the collinearity of the variables.
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Std. Error Standardized 
Coefficients Beta
T Sig.
(Constant) 38,118 9,390 4,060 0,001
Stage index 16,796 3,830 0,689 4,386 0,000
Amount of capital 
under management
-6,658 1,801 -0,755 -3,696 0,002
transformed 
Geographic scope 6,382 1,976 0,646 3,230 0,005
Predictors: (Constant), stage index, amount of capital under management transformed, geographic scope 
Dependent Variable: industry HHI 
Adjusted RA2 =0,563; F=9,8317; p=0,001
In Finland, all the three variables in the circular model relating with industry diversification 
were significant in the regression model, and explained 56 percent of the variance in actual 
industry diversification*. The directions were the same as suggested by the partial correlation 
analysis. These results give further support to the hypothesis.
In the Israeli sample, the amount of fund capital was eliminated from the regression model, 
whereas the actual number of portfolio companies remained in the model. The other two 
remaining variables, preferred stage index and geographic scope, of the circular model are 
statistically significant in explaining industry diversification. The three remaining predictors 
explain 54 percent of the variance in the actual industry diversification in Israel.
* In the Finnish sample, the actual number of portfolio companies became insignificant, and was eliminated from 
the regression model.
Table 10 Multiple linear regression analysis of actual industry diversification for the









(Constant) 77,622 8,162 9,511 0,000
Stage index -3,783 1,713 -0,238 -2,209 0,034
Geographic scope 6,036 2,870 0,227 2,103 0,043
Actual number of -12,417 1,966 -0,681 -6,315 0,000
portfolio companies
transformed
Predictors: (Constant), stage index, geographic scope, and actual number of portfolio companies transformed 
Dependent Variable: industry HHI 
Adjusted RA2=0,546; F=9,8470; p=0,000
7.1.5. Discussion of the Circular Model of Diversification
Finland Israel
Geographic scope ■*------  Capital under management Geographic scope *------  Capital under management
4 у* IT j>""' \ +
Industry diversification * * LatestaBe Industry diversification "* Late stage
Figure 18 Circular model of diversification for Finland and Israel
Figure 18 shows the final circular diversification models for Finland and Israel. First, as 
expected, capital under management was positively related to the preferred geographic scope, 
and to late venture stage in both sample countries*. Second, the preferred geographic scope 
seemed to be negatively related to industry diversification in both sample countries. Third, the 
preferred geographic scope seemed to be negatively related to the preferred stage 
diversification in Israel. These results suggest that geographic diversification would seem to 
be a substitute rather than a complement for industry and venture stage diversification.
In Finland, according to the portfolio theory, VCFs investing in late stage ventures preferred 
less industry diversification and also in reality were less industry-diversified. On the other
‘Capital under management is positively related to industry diversification in Finland, but the relationship is not 
as strong in Israel. Although capital under management is on average larger in Finland, the median test showed 
no significant difference between the countries (p=0,214). In the interviews, large Finnish venture capitalists 
claimed that there are not enough potential companies in any particular industry to permit large funds to be 
committed purely in it. Hence, there may be a better deal flow in Israel than in Finland, which allows even larger 
venture capital funds to concentrate on certain industries.
hand, venture capital funds in Israel seemed to operate according to the specialization 
hypothesis. The hypotheses regarding diversification were based on from previous studies 
carried out in US. Israel and US venture capital industries share a lot of similarities, such as 
focus on small high-tech ventures, whereas Finland represents a European style of venture 
capital, where the emphasis is more on mature low-tech ventures. The most probable reason 
for this distinctive difference is the large difference in the share of high-tech investments 
between the countries. The results suggest that the cost of gaining knowledge is higher in 
high-tech than in low-tech industries. An other interesting explanations is that Finnish VCFs, 
which focus on early venture stages, are unable to add sufficiently value to their portfolio 
companies and are, therefore, better off diversifying their portfolios across a large number of 
different industries.
7.1.6. Results of Stage Diversification
If VCFs specialize on certain venture stages, then the percent of capital in a given stage 
should be positively related to those of nearby stages as a result of follow-on investments. In 
addition, a negative relationship should exist between non-consecutive venture stages.
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Table 11 shows the correlation between the actual percent of capital invested in a given 
venture stage for the Finnish sample. The data was obtained from 16 Finnish VCFs through 
the questionnaire. Looking at the table, the pattern is clear. All correlation coefficients are 
positive with the neighbor stages and negative with the non-consecutive stages. The only 
exception from this rule is that other early stage and seed financing are positively correlated, 
although they are not consecutive stages*. However, most of the coefficients are insignificant. 
Hence, I may only interpret these results as giving weak support for the specialization 
hypothesis H2b.
Chapter 7 Results and Discussion 71
* I left the turnaround stage out of the analysis, because it does not fit into this theory as well as the other stages. 
The tumaroud stage does not represent well the stage in which the company is. Usually turnaround occurs at a 
late stage, but it could also occur at a quite early stage.
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Table 11 The Kendall tau-b correlation coefficients relating to VCFs’ venture stage 
diversification for the Finnish sample
Seed Start-up Other early stage expansion MBO/MBI 6
Start up 0,073
■ sig. ,361
Other early stige 0,134 0,152
sig. ,256 sig. ,216
Expansion ,f- ЩШ -0,032 -0,046 0,036.Ililli
lililí!! sig. 439 sig. ,408 sig. ,426MBO/MB1 -0,038 -0,308 -0,587** 0,056
: " sig. ,431 sig. ,069 sig. ,002 sig. ,395
Bridge -0,041 -0,250 -0,047 -0,024 0,303
yeeee- sig. ,427 sig. ,119 sig. ,412 sig. ,455 sig. ,091
Table 12 The Kendall tau-b correlation coefficients relating to VCFs’ venture stage 
diversification for the Israeli sample





















liter*' ' ' ' sig. ,000 sig. ,000 sig. ,064 sig. ,182
Bridge -,337** -0,420** -0,172 -0,120 ,557**
g sig. ,002 sig. ,000 sig. ,074 sig. ,156 sig. ,000
Table 12 shows the correlation coefficients relating to Israeli venture capital funds’
preferences regarding the venture stage. If the venture capital fund stated making investment 
in the stage in question, the variable was given a value of one and otherwise it was zero. The 
data contained 72 Israeli venture capital funds. As can be seen from the Table 12, there is a 
similar pattem favoring the specialization hypothesis in Israel. In addition, many of the 
correlation coefficients are significant, which allows me to interpret these results in support of 
the hypothesis H2b.
7.1.7. Results Relating to Public VCFs in Finland
In order to study how the origin of capital affects the behavior of VCFs, I ran a regression 
analysis on the actual portfolio investment data. Table 13 shows the result from this 
regression analysis. The dependent variable, type of the VCF, is either one or zero. The 
dependent variables are the number of employees in the portfolio company, whether the 
portfolio operates in a high- or low-tech industry, the portfolio company’s proximity to the 
VCF’s office, and the annual sales of the portfolio company. The operationalization of the 
variables are shown below the table.
Table 13 Multiple regression analysis
Chapter 7 Results and Discussion 73
Unstandardized 
Coefficients В
Std. EiTor Standardized 
Coefficients Beta
T Sig.
(Constant) ,419 0,040 10,593 0,000
Number of employe-es in the portfolio 2.748E-04 0,000 0,193 3,645 0,000
company
Portfolio company о•perales in a high- -.218 0,049 -0,222 -4,466 0,000
tech industry
Portfolio company’s proximity to 8.417E-02 0,044 0,097 1,923 0,055
VCFs office
Annual sales (million FIM) 1.623E-04 0,000 0,121 2,256 0,025
Predictors: (Constant), Number of employees in the portfolio company, Portfolio company operates in a high-tech industry (high-tech=l 
and low-tech=0), Portfolio company's proximity to VCFs office (same state=0;other Finnish state=l ;abroad=2), Annual sales (million 
FIM)
Dependent Variable: Type of the VCF (public=0;private=l)
Adjusted RA2=0,119; F=13,S0; p=0,000
The results give strong support for both of my hypotheses relating to public funds. First, 
public funds have a significantly higher propensity to invest in high-tech firms than private 
VCFs do (p=0,000). Second, public VCFs have a significantly higher propensity to invest in 
smaller companies, both in terms of employees (p=0,000) and sales (p=0,025). In addition, 
public VCFs in general are more locally oriented according to their actual portfolio 
investments (p=0,055).
In addition, there are some interesting results that can be obtained from investment 
preferences using the tau-b correlation analysis. First, public VCFs prefer a narrower 
geographic scope than privately owned firms do (p=0,025). Second, public VCFs prefer more 
often minority holdings in their portfolio companies than private VCFs do (p=0,029). Third, 
public VCFs tend to prefer the early stage (p=0,046) and as a result the average investment 
size is significantly less than that of private VCFs (p=0,002).
In summary, both of my hypotheses received support. In addition, public funds tend to be 
more locally oriented both according to their investment preferences and actual investments 
than private VCFs are. This is probably because there are several public funds, which were 
originally formed to operate locally in order to boost the local economic activity - Indekon 
Management Oy, Karinvest Oy, and Savo Investment Management Oy, to name a few. 
Another explanation relates to public VCFs’ focus early stage. Earlier it was shown that early 
stage tend to be closer to VCFs’ offices.
The large amount of government related venture capital in Finland may be one explanation 
why there seems to be few Finnish private VCFs that focus on early high-tech ventures. If 
public related have biases in investing in early high-tech ventures, this may result in
overvaluing such companies*. If this argument were true, one would expect the risk-adjusted 
returns from early stage investment to be relative low compared to late stage investments. 
Unfortunately, no information on the returns is at this point available from Finland. Another 
explanation relates to the private bank-related VCFs. Many of the venture capitalists in these 
firms have their background in the financial sector. Hence, they are likely to be more familiar 
with later round ventures, such as MBOs, which require more financial know-how than 
knowledge of running a small business.
7.2. Syndication
This chapter deepens the analysis of the empirical data. First, the results of testing the 
hypotheses regarding the resource exchange model are presented. Then the relationship 
between diversification and syndication is explored. Then a regression analysis on syndication 
is presented along with the presentation of the results from the questionnaire. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the results.
7.2.1. Results Relating to Munificence
To measure the degree of scarcity of capital I will use two measures. The first is simply the 
amount of capital under management, which was previously used as a construct in Bygrave* 122.
To study VCFs syndication patterns, I first divide VCFs into two separate groups by median. I 
use median so that there would be approximately the same number of firms in each group. 
Then I calculate the sum of intra and intergroup direct links. I also calculate the sum of sole 
investments, that is, investments that are not syndicated for each group. The parties on the 
right in Figure 19 represent the two groups. VCFs with more than 90 million of capital under 
management are considered large and those with less capital under management as small. 
There are 12 large and 11 small Finnish VCFs of which investments I have data. The bulks on 
the left and middle represent the share of direct links with the corresponding group. It can be 
thought of as the probability of syndicating with that group. For example small VCFs have 88 
percent of their direct links with large VCFs, and only 12 percent among other small VCFs.
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* One private Finnish venture capitalist claimed that public subsidies worsen the deal flow that venture capitalists 
receive. The best high-tech companies are able to grow with the subsidies. Only those companies, to which the 
subsidies are insufficient, apply for venture capital.
122 Bygrave, W. 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: a network perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing, volume 2.
It should be intuitively clear that the absolute number of links between the two groups must be 
equal. Thus, 32 percent of the direct links of large VCFs equals 29, as does 88 percent of the 
direct links of small VCFs. This means that large VCFs have made more syndications than 
small ones. There are three ways in which this condition can be fulfilled. First, large VCFs 
may have more syndications because they have made more portfolio investments. Second, 
large VCFs may have more syndications because they have a higher overall propensity to 
syndicate. Finally, large VCFs may have more syndications because of the combination of 
these two previous points. As the bulks on the right in Figure 19 reflect the propensities of 
syndication of the two groups*. The figure shows that large VCFs tend to have a higher 
propensity to syndicate overall than small VCFs.
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to the Amount of Capital Under Management
Probability of 
syndicating with the 
small capital under 
management group
Probability of 
syndicating with the 
large capital under 
management group
Large capital under management group 
Small capital under management group
Direct links / sole 
investments
Figure 19 Syndication patterns related to the amount of capital under management for 
the Finnish sample
* The direct links-to-soles -ratio is a leveraged measure of the propensity to syndicate.
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Israel
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to the Amount of Capital Under Management
o%
Probability of
syndicating with _ . ..... ,
the small capital r° 11 ^ 0 
. syndicating with 
under management ^ |grge œp|(a| Direct links / sole
group under management ¡"vestments 
group
Large capital under management group 
Small capital under management group
Figure 20 Syndication patterns related to the amount of capital under management for 
the Israeli sample
Figures 19 and 20 show that the syndication patterns regarding capital under management are 
very similar in both countries. First, the VCFs with a large amount of capital under 
management tend to syndicate among other large VCFs. Second, small VCFs prefer to invest 
with large VCFs rather than within their own group. Third, large VCFs have a significantly 
higher propensity to syndicate overall (p=0,007). The last result is against my hypothesis, 
because according to the resource exchange model the lack of capital resources should 
increase the level of со-investing, all other things equal. The most apparent difference 
between the counties is that the level of со-investing is much higher in Israel than in Finland.
To test statistically the differences regarding syndication between the groups, I use the Chi- 
square test, which was also used by Bygrave in his corresponding analysis. The Chi-square 
test measures the difference between the expected frequency and the observed frequency. The 
analysis covers 23 Finnish VCFs and 43 Israeli VCFs. It should be noted that the syndications 
were calculated for each venture capital firm not for each fund also in Israel. Table 14 shows 
the expected and observed numbers of syndication of large and small Finnish VCFs. The 
corresponding data for the Israeli VCFs is shown in Table 15. The tables show that VCFs with 
a large amount of capital under management have a significantly higher propensity so 
syndicate than small VCFs.
Table 14 Proportion of pairs to sole investments of large and small Finnish VCFs by 
capital under management
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Finland Small capital under Large capital under management
management
Capital under management (million FIM)
Number of VCFs in each group
Observed number of syndication pairs 
(expected)









Table 15 Proportion of pairs to sole investments of large and small Israeli VCFs by 
capital under management
Israel Small capital under 
management
Large capital under management
Capital under management (million FIM) <=24 >24
Number of VCFs in each group 22 21
Observed number of syndication pairs 516 262
(expected) (500,8) (277,2)
Observed number of sole investments 120 90
(expected) (135,2) (74,8)
Хл2=6,08; df—1; p=0,0I37
Here, I must make a comment on the validity of the measure. The amount of capital under 
management has several weaknesses in measuring the scarcity of capital resources. First, 
capital under management ignores the amount of capital already invested. Thus, a more 
appropriate measure, in my opinion, would be the capital available for investments, because it 
represents the amount of capital a venture capital firm can invest without a need to raise 
additional capital. Second, because venture capital firms have different investment strategies, 
which relate to different average investment sizes, the absolute amount of capital available for 
investment is likely to be an inadequate measure. For example, ten million may be a sufficient 
amount for a VCF focusing on seed stage to finance 20 portfolio companies. The same ten 
million may only allow another VCF to invest in one late stage investment. Surely, the late 
stage investor would face a more severe scarcity of capital resources. Third, capital under 
management is taken from a certain point of time, whereas the obtained syndications may 
have occurred during several years. A VCF may have lacked capital resources in the past but 
has raised funds recently, and hence now shows not to have any scarcity of capital.
The first two weaknesses can be circumvented by dividing the amount of capital available for 
investment by the average investment size. Unfortunately, the third and perhaps the most 
important problem remains. Thus, the results must be regarded as suggestive only.
My second construct of capital resources was calculated as the capital available for investment 
divided by the average investment size. Here the average investment size was assumed to be
in Finland the typical investment size and in Israel the average of maximum and minimum 
investment. The results were similar in Israel to those above. Those Israeli VCFs, which had 
large relative capital resources, had a significantly higher propensity to syndicate (p=0,015). 
However, the relationship between the propensity to syndicate and the capital resources 
became insignificant for the Finnish sample (p=0,39).
To measure the scarcity of deal flow of prospective investments, I asked venture capitalists in 
the questionnaire about the approximate number of proposals per one investment. 
Unfortunately, half of the respondents failed to answer the question, and with only 9 
responses from Finland and 5 from Israel, it would have been unreasonable to make any 
empirical tests. Hence, I must conclude that I was unable to test the hypothesis H6b 
empirically. The reason for the low number of responses of deal flow is likely to be due to the 
characteristics of information, which seems to be both hard to obtain and sensitive in nature.
7.2.2. Discussion Relating to Munificence
The results would seem to suggest that Israeli venture capital firms with a large amount of 
capital resources might have a higher propensity to syndicate than VCFs with small capital 
resources. However, munificence proved to be very difficult to measure. Forming a good 
construct of scarcity of capital resources would require a dynamic variable and a longitudinal 
study, which would take into account that both the VCF’s capital resources and its propensity 
to syndicate change over time. I was not able to form such a construct. In addition, I was 
unable to empirically test the scarcity of deal flow, because of the low number of replies. 
Hence, the empirical results relating to munificence cannot be regarded as highly valid, and 
ought to be interpreted with caution. I interpret these results as neither giving support to nor 
against my hypotheses.
7.2.3. Results Relating to Concentration
I will use two measures of concentration. The first is simply the amount of capital invested, 
which was used in Bygrage (1987). The second relates to the proximity of VCFs offices.
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns In Relation to the Amount of Capital Invested
Probability of syndicating 
with the small invested Probability of syndicating 
capital group with the large invested 
capital group
Large invested capital group
invested capital group
Direct links / sole 
investments
Figure 21 Syndication patterns related to the amount of capital invested for the Finnish 
sample
Israel
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capital group Direct links / sole 
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Figure 22 Syndication patterns related to the amount of capital invested for the Israeli 
sample
Figures 21 and 22 show that the syndication patterns regarding the amount of capital invested 
are very similar in both countries. First, large investors syndicate significantly more often 
among other large investors as hypothesized (p=0,000). Second, small VCFs prefer to invest
with large VCFs rather than within their own group. Third, large VCFs have a significantly 
higher propensity to syndicate overall in Israel (p=0,016), and in Finland (p=0,071) than small 
VCFs.
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to VCFs* Location
Helsinki group
Other location groupProbability of 
syndicating with VCFs 
outside the Helsinki
Probability of 
syndicating with VCFs 
from the Helsinki area
Direct links / sole 
investments
Figure 23 Syndication patterns related to VCFs’ location for the Finnish sample
Israel
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns In Relation to VCFs' Location
Figure 24 Syndication patterns related to VCFs’ location for the Israeli sample
In Israel, VCFs are concentrated in Tel Aviv. 21 out of the 43 VCFs from which I had actual 
portfolio investments are located there. In Finland, the industry is even more concentrated on
the Helsinki area - 15 out of the 23 VCFs from which I had actual portfolio investments are 
located there.
In Helsinki, this high concentration seems to have a strong impact on syndication patterns. 
First, VCFs outside Helsinki seem to almost exclusively syndicate intergroup. Second, VCFs 
from Helsinki have a significantly higher propensity to syndicate intragroup than with VCFs 
outside Helsinki, as hypothesized (p=0,000). Third, those VCFs located in Helsinki, have a 
significantly higher overall propensity to syndicate than those VCFs outside Helsinki 
(p=0,000). This higher overall propensity to syndicate may be a result of the higher 
concentration and competition in the Helsinki area.
In Israel, contrary to the findings in Finland, the high concentration in Tel Aviv area does not 
affect syndication patterns. Those VCFs located outside Tel Aviv are just as likely be 
syndication partners as those in Tel Aviv (p=0,565). Moreover, those VCFs outside Tel Aviv 
have a slightly higher propensity to syndicate than those from the Tel Aviv area (p=0,279). 
These results do not give support to my hypothesis.
7.2.4. Discussion Relating to Concentration
The amount of capital invested was positively related to the propensity to syndicate in both 
countries. Moreover, VCFs with large amounts of capital invested preferred to syndicate 
among each other. The five largest Finnish VCFs in terms of the amount of capital invested 
account for 74 percent of the total capital invested and for 22 percent of the number of VCFs 
in my syndication study. The corresponding numbers for Israel are ten, 74 percent, and 23 
percent. Hence the level of concentration seems to be approximately the same in the sample 
countries in terms of capital invested. Also VCFs’ degree of geographical concentration in the 
Helsinki and Tel Aviv area are similar.
In summary, Finland and Israel seem to have a relatively similar degree of concentration in 
terms of capital invested and the location of VCFs’ offices. Hence, these measures of the level 
of concentration do not seem to explain why Israeli venture capital firms have a substantially 
higher propensity to syndicate than their Finnish counter-partners.
However, portfolio companies’ geographic concentration may provide an answer. In Finland, 
26 percent of the capital is invested in portfolio companies located in Southern Finland. The 
corresponding number for the Tel Aviv area is 67 percent. This high concentration of Israeli 
portfolio companies in the Tel Aviv area may force the VCFs outside the region to syndicate
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with the VCFs in the region, in order to obtain deal flow. This phenomenon would also 
explain the high number of intergroup syndication in Israel.
7.2.5. Results Relating to Uncertainty
The exchange resource model states that uncertainty increases the propensity of syndication. 
The uncertainties studied in this chapter relate to the risk associated with early stage and 
technology of the portfolio company. These uncertainties were examined in Bygrave (1987). 
In addition, the uncertainties relating to venture stage, industry, company and geographic 
diversification are explored.
Uncertainty Related to Venture Stage
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to VCFs' Preferred Venture Stage Index
20 %-
Early stage index group
Late stage index groupProbability of syndicating
with the early stage indexprobability of syndicating 
group with the late stage index
group
Direct links / sole 
investments
Figure 25 Syndication patterns related to venture stage index for the Finnish sample
In Finland the venture stage index tends to divide VCFs into two groups, early and late 
VCFs, that have a relatively low level of interconnection. Both late stage and early stage 
VCFs prefer to syndicate within their own group. Hence, venture stage index seems to 
explain well with which VCFs syndicate. However, the venture stage does not seem to 
affect the overall level of syndication on the VCF level, since both groups have similar 
links to soles- ratios (p=0,256). However, the correlation coefficients from actual 
portfolio company investments, shown in Table 16, indicate that late stage ventures are 
significantly more likely to be syndicated than early stage ventures.
Table 16 The Kendall tau-b correlation coefficients between the construct relating to 
external syndication and venture stage characteristics for the Finnish sample
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Number of Sales (millions of FIM)
employees
External syndication Correlation ,124** 0,052
»
|i Coefficient
Sig. (1-tailed) 0,002 0,115
» N_________ '_______ 365_____________ 371_____________________
In summary, there seems to be strong evidence against the hypothesis H8a, and I therefore 
conclude that late stage implies external syndication in Finland.
Israel
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to VCFs* Preferred Venture Stage Index
Probability of syndicating 
with the early stage indexprobability of syndicating 
group with the late stage index
group
Late stage index group 
Early stage index group
Direct links / sole 
investments
Figure 26 Syndication patterns related to venture stage index for the Israeli sample
Figure 26 illustrates how the VCFs’ venture stage index affects syndication patterns in Israel. 
Actually, the venture stage index does not seem to affect syndication patterns at all. VCFs 
focusing on early stage ventures are just as likely to syndicate intragroup as they are to 
syndicate intergroup. The overall propensities of syndication of the groups are equal as well 
(P=0,913).
An explanation for this lies in the dynamics of round financing. The focus of Israeli 
investments has been on smaller, earlier stage companies, which have grown rapidly in a short 
time. Thus, it is common for a portfolio company belonging to a VCF with an early stage 
focus to eventually need to be passed to a VCF with a later stage focus. Thus, a dynamic of 
passing the portfolio company is created, as the early stage firm at least partially exits the 
investment, and the later stage firm picks it up. If this is true, then one would expect to find a
large number of later-round syndications. Given the relatively low number of later-round 
syndications compared to first-round syndications in Finland, there is little evidence that this 
dynamic takes place consistently in Finland over this period of analysis. Unfortunately, I was 
unable to further validate this explanation, because I lacked the data from later-round 
syndications in Israel.
Contrary to my hypothesis and to what previous research has found from US, early stage does 
not imply higher propensity to syndicate in either of the sample countries. In fact, the results 
suggest the opposite is more likely to be the case.
Uncertainty Related to Technology of the Portfolio Company
Investments in high-tech industries increase the likelihood of syndication. There is strong 
evidence in both countries in support of my hypothesis. The finding is consistent with finance 
theory, since risky high-tech investments ought to be syndicated more often than low risk 
investments. Regression analysis reveals that high technology explains only 5,4 percent of all 
syndications. The relationship is, however, significant - as Table 17 shows.
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Table 17 Regression analysis model of external syndication for the Finnish samle
Unstandardized 
Coefficients В
Sid. Erro r Standardized 
Coefficients Beta
t Sig.
(Constant) ,170 ,030 5,573 ,000
Portfolio company operating in a 
high-tech industry
,108 ,044 ,125 2,463 ,014
Number of employees in the 
portfolio company
2,775E-04 ,000 ,219 4,317 ,000
Predictors: (Constant), Number of employees Portfolio company operating in a high-tech industry 
Dependent Variable: external syndication 
Adjuster R'2=0,060; F=I2,675 (p=0,000)
In Finland, syndication patterns are very difficult to explain. Table 17 shows the regression 
analysis with two predictors. The explanatory power of the model is weak although the model 
itself is statistically significant. High-tech companies and companies with a large number of 
employees are more likely to be syndicated than small low-tech companies.
High-tech companies in general, tend to be smaller both in terms of actual investment size as 
well as measured by the number of employees. In 1997, the average investment size in low- 
tech industries was in Finland 4,9 million and only 2,8 million in high-tech industries. 
Moreover, as can be seen from Table 18 the correlation coefficients between the high-tech
code and the number of employees, sales, and percent of ownership are all statistically 
significant*.
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Table 18 The tau-b correlations of high-tech company for the Finnish investment data
Number of Sales Percent of
employees (millions of 
FIM)
Ownership
High-tech company Correlation -,154** -,195** -,107*
a
f« Coefficient
■ Sig. (1-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,021
^365 371 322
Table 19 shows the regression analysis between external syndication and high-tech for the 
Israeli sample. The results show that also in Israel high-tech implies syndication.
Table 19 Multiple Regression analysis of external syndication and high-tech company 
for the Israeli investment data
Unstandardized 
Coefficients В
Std. Error Standardized Coefficients 
Beta
t Sig.
(Constant) I 0,26 0,066 3,911 0,000
High-tech company 1 0,405 0,07 0,236 5,819 0,000
Predictors: (Constant), HIGHTECH
Dependent Variable: Syndication
Adjusted RA2=0,054; F=33,864 (p=0,000) (N=578)
* Because syndication is also negatively related to ownership and positively related to high-tech, I made a partial 
correlation test between the ownership percentage and high-tech company, where I controlled for syndication. 
The test showed that high-tech companies give significantly less ownership to venture capitalists than low-tech 
ventures (p=0,025)
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to VCFs' Technology Focus
Figure 27 Syndication patterns related to technology intensity of the VCF for the 
Finnish sample
Israel
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns In Relation to VCFs' Technology Focus
Figure 28 Syndication patterns related to technology intensity of the VCF for the Israeli 
sample
In the Finnish sample, the VCFs with a large proportion of high-tech companies, tend to 
syndicate among themselves, whereas low-tech VCFs have as much intragroup- as intergroup-
syndications. As expected, high-tech VCFs have a significantly higher overall propensity to 
syndicate than low-tech VCFs in Finland (p=0,007).
In Israel, technology intensity does not seem to affect the selection of syndication partners. 
However, it does affect the overall propensity to syndicate (p=0,047), as in Finland.
Uncertainty Related to Industry Diversification
Uncertainty increases as the industry diversification decreases. Hence, according to the 
resource exchange model, one would expect VCFs that have a low degree of industry 
diversification to syndicate more.
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to VCFs' Actual Industry Diversification
diversification group investments
Figure 29 Syndication patterns related to industry diversification for the Finnish sample
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Figure 30 Syndication patterns related to industry diversification for the Israeli sample
The Figures 29 and 30 show that the syndication patterns regarding industry diversification 
are very similar in both countries. First, VCFs that are well-diversified across industries, tend 
to syndicate within their own group. Second, industry-focused VCFs prefer to invest 
intergroup, that is, with industry-diversified VCFs rather than within their own group. Third, 
industry-diversified VCFs have a significantly higher propensity to syndicate overall in Israel 
(p=0,001) and in Finland (p=0,093).
Industry diversification is namely one of the possible reasons for VCFs to syndicate. Thus, 
even tough there is a positive correlation between industry diversification and the propensity 
to syndicate, we do not know the causality. It may be that VCFs syndicate in order to be able 
to invest in a greater number of different industries, and as a result, become industry- 
diversified. Or it may be that VCFs with well industry-diversified portfolios simply syndicate 
for some other reason. I return to this question in the next chapter, where I discuss the results 
obtained from the questionnaire.
Uncertainty Related to Venture Stage Diversification
The Figures 31 and 32 show that the syndication patterns regarding venture stage 
diversification. The results suggests that well stage-diversified VCFs have a higher propensity 
to syndicate overall in Israel (p=O,058) as well as in Finland (p=0,098). A second interesting 
aspect of the results is that Finnish VCFs would seem to prefer intragroup co-investing,
whereas Israeli VCFs prefer relatively more intergroup syndications. Once again, one 
explanation relates to the dynamics of round financing discussed earlier.
In summary, these results give support to the hypothesized reason that VCFs syndicate in 
order to diversify across venture stages for both sample countries.
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to VCFs' Preferred Stage Diversification
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Figure 31 Syndication patterns related to stage diversification for the Finnish sample
Israel
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Figure 32 Syndication patterns related to stage diversification for the Israeli sample
Uncertainty Related to Geographic Diversification
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The Figures 33 and 34 show that the syndication patterns regarding the VCFs’ preferred 
geographic scope. The results suggests that those VCFs with a broad preferred geographic 
scope tend to have a higher propensity to syndicate overall in Finland (p=0,094), but not in 
Israel (p=0,992). Another interesting aspect relates to the relatively high intergroup 
syndication in Finland. One explanation of this is that those VCFs with a broad geographic 
scope syndicate with local VCFs, which are likely to have a more active role in assisting the 
portfolio company. The results regarding the Israeli sample must be considered as suggestive 
only, because the median of the preferred geographic scope divided the VCFs unevenly to the 
groups. There the narrow geographic group consists of 33 VCFs, whereas the broad 
geographic group includes only eight VCFs.
In summary, these results give support to the hypothesized reason that VCFs syndicate in 
order to diversify geographically for the Finnish sample.
Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to VCFs' Preferred Geographic Scope
Probability of 
syndicating with the 
narrow geographic Probability of
ПГЛ1syndicating with the 
scope group broa(j geographic Direct links / sole
scope group investments
Broad geographic scope group 
Narrow preferred geographic scope group
Figure 33 Syndication patterns related to geographic diversification for the Finnish 
sample
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Figure 34 Syndication patterns related to geographic diversification for the Israeli 
sample
Uncertainty Related to Company Specific Characteristics
The Figures 35 and 36 show that the syndication patterns regarding the company specific risk 
diversification are very similar in both countries. First, VCFs that have a high number of 
portfolio companies, tend to syndicate within their own group. Second, those VCFs with few 
portfolio companies prefer to invest intergroup, that is, with VCFs that have many portfolio 
companies rather than within their own group. Third, company-diversified VCFs have a 
significantly higher propensity to syndicate overall in Israel (p=0,000), but not in Finland 
(p=0,629).
One explanation why VCFs with few portfolio companies prefer to invest intergroup rather 
than within their own group relates to the accumulation of expertise and experience. More 
established VCFs may have gained knowledge that young inexperienced VCFs are aiming at 
obtaining through close relationships. Lemer found that in the first financial round, 
established venture capitalists tend to syndicate with one another. Later rounds involve less 
established venture organizations. He argued that these findings are consistent with the view
that syndication allows venture capitalists to obtain information in order to decide whether to 
invest in a given firm123.
In summary, these results give support for the hypothesized reason that VCFs syndicate in 
order to diversify the company specific risk for the Israeli sample.
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Finland
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to the Number of VCFs' Portfolio Companies
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syndicating with the . ..... ,3, ti. „ Probability of 
low number of .. .._ .. . syndicating with the
portfolio companies hjgh number Qf Direct links / sole
group portfolio companies investments
group
High number of portfolio companies group 
Low number of portfolio companies group
Figure 35 Syndication patterns related to the number of portfolio companies for the 
Finnish sample
123 Lemer, J. 1994. The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments. Financial Management, volume 23, 3, 
Autumn 1994. pp25-26
Chapter 7 Results and Discussion 93
Israel
Inter- and Intragroup Syndication Patterns in Relation to the Number of VCFs' Portfolio Companies
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Figure 36 Syndication patterns related to the number of portfolio companies for the 
Israeli sample
Regression Analysis
Tables 21 and 22 present the results from the regression analysis, which was performed in 
order to further evaluate how technology, venture stage index, industry diversification, capital 
resources, geographic scope, and the number of portfolio companies affect the VCFs’ 
propensities to syndicate. The variable propensity to syndicate was used as the dependent 
variable in the regression model. The tables present regression models that consist of only 
those variables that remained in the model because of a significant correlation with the 
dependent variable.
Table 20 Multiple linear regression analysis of venture capital firms’ propensity to 
syndicate for the Finnish sample
Unstandardized 
Coefficients В
Std. Eror Standardized 
Coefficients Beta
t Sig.
(Constant) -0,363 0,213 -1,701 0,107
Stage index 0,175 0,083 0,444 2,117 0,049
Percent of portfolio companies in 
the high-tech industries
0,005 0,002 0,516 2,462 0,025
Predictors: (Constant), Stage index, Percent of portfolio companies in the high-tech industries 
Dependent Variable: Propensity to syndicate 
Adjusted RA2=0,243; F=4,054;p=0,036
Table 21 Multiple linear regression analysis of venture capital firms’ propensity to 
syndicate for the Israeli sample
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Unstandardized 
Coefficients В
Std. Error Standardized 
Coefficients Beta
t Sig.
(Constant) 0,686 0,239 2,863 0,006
Industry diversification -0,006 0,003 -0,304 -2,188 0,034
Percent of portfolio companies in 
the high-tech
0,003 0,002 0,199 1,433 0,159
Predictors: (Constant), Industry diversification, Percent of portfolio companies in the high-tech 
Dependent Variable: Propensity to syndicate 
Adjusted №2=0,092; F=3,375:p=0,043
The regression results suggest that in Finland late stage and technology are the main factors 
influencing the propensity to syndicate. For the Israeli sample, industry diversification would 
seem to be the dominant factor leading VCFs to syndicate. Also technology receives weak 
support in Israel on the VCF level. The main reason why these regression results differ from 
those results presented earlier is that the data used in the regression gives equal weight to 
every case, that is, to every VCF. The results presented earlier, on the other hand, gave 
weights to the VCFs according to the number of investments a given VCF had made.
7.2.6. Discussion relating to Uncertainty
--------------------------------^ Risk related to high-tech Risk related to early stage
^mailer investment Smaller învestmer^
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Figure 37 How the risk related to high-tech, early venture stage, and size of investment 
affects the propensity to syndicate
Figure 37 shows the relationships that were found from both countries regarding the 
propensity to syndicate. Investment size, high-tech and venture stage can each be thought of 
as vector pulling the propensity to syndicate into different directions.
High-tech was found to increase the probability of syndication. In addition, we found that 
high-tech ventures were smaller in terms of average investment. The amount of total capital 
invested in the portfolio company should, according to the portfolio theory, be positively 
related to syndication. It seems that the increased level of risk associated with high-tech 
dominates the decrease in risk associated with smaller investment size. High-tech ventures are 
only marginally smaller than low-tech ones, which leaves syndication of high-tech ventures 
more desirable.
The opposite is true with early stage ventures. Even though an early stage investment is 
considered riskier than a late stage investment, late stage ventures are syndicated relatively 
more often. This phenomenon can also be explained with portfolio theory. Because early stage 
investments are often several times smaller than late stage ventures, the risk associated with 
the early stage is not sufficient to compensate the risk associated with the investment size. 
Hence, syndicating late stage investment becomes desirable.
Notice that my results are contrary to those of Bygrave124, who found that in US early stage 
implied syndication even though the investment size was significantly larger in late stage 
ventures. Concentration may be another reason why late the stage implies syndication in 
Finland. Concentration is high in Finland at later venture stages. Because concentration 
implies syndicatiotions, perhaps that is why we see so many syndications in larger companies 
rather than early stage ventures.
7.2.7. Reasons to Syndicate
Figure 38 shows the average grades given to different reasons to syndicate. The results were 
obtained from the questionnaire, where venture capitalists were asked to state the relative 
importance of the reasons for syndication. The first five bars from the left represent financial 
risk management reasons to syndicate, whereas the next six bars deal with information sharing 
issues. The two rightmost bars are calculated by averaging the corresponding bars.
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124 Bygrave, W. 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: a network perspective. Journal of 
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Figure 38 shows that venture capitalists from both countries share very similar views of the 
reasons to syndicate. Consequently, the five most important reasons to syndicate are the same 
in both countries- allowing larger investments, sharing of deal flow, spreading of company 
specific risk, building industry-specific network, and making better investment decisions. 
Three of these five most important reasons relate to the information sharing hypothesis. Two 
results seem to differ between Israel and Finland. First, Israeli VCFs seem not to syndicate in 
order to invest in a greater geographic scope. This may be because Israel is not as large as 
Finland and Israeli VCFs are searching for investment opportunities from the whole Israel 
from the beginning. Second, Finnish VCFs do not seem to appreciate the joint investment 
decision procedure as much. This may be due to the lack of Finnish VCFs’ industry focus and 
specific industry expertise. In Finland, a possible syndication partner with low industry focus 
is likely to know as much - or more likely - as little from the value of the company as the 
other venture capitalist - hence reducing the value of making a joint investment evaluation.
Empirical results suggested that the different means of diversification are positively related to 
the level of syndication. The causality, however, is not clear. One could argue that syndication 
drives diversification, because a high propensity to syndicate enables VCFs to diversify their 
portfolios, and as a result of syndication they become well-diversified.
On the other hand, those VCFs with well-diversified portfolios may want to syndicate with 
VCFs, which are more familiar with a given industry, and therefore, in a better position to 
assist the portfolio company. While both arguments are likely to explain the positive 
relationship, the latter causality is further supported by the results from the questionnaire. 
Venture capitalists seem to agree that syndication enables them to diversify across industries, 
venture stages, companies, and geographic location. Morover, the latter scenario would 
suggest that VCFs with well-diversified portfolios would preferably syndicate with VCFs 
specializing in certain industries. However, the results indicate the opposite is true, that is, 
VCFs with highly industry-diversified portfolios prefer to syndicate among themselves. In 
summary, the results would seem to suggest that venture capitalists syndicate because they 
want to diversify their portfolios.
7.2.8. A comment on the network
The venture capital networks in Finland and in Israel are highly connected compared to the 
previous findings from US. The overall connectedness of the network, that is the percentage 
of pairs with one or more actual co-investments to the maximum number of all possible pairs,
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is 7 percent in Finland and as high as 24 percent in Israel compared to 2,3 percent in US. 
However, the connectedness of the top 61 VCFs in US was 22 percent, which is close to that 
found in Israel. Israeli venture capital industry would seem to be tightly coupled, whereas 
Finland in more on the loosely coupled side. The advantages and disadvantages relating to a 
tightly coupled network were discussed earlier.
In Finland the network is simple. There is one central party, which accounts for 30,6 percent 
of the co-investment pairs, and has syndicated with 12 different VCFs. In Israel, the network 
is more balanced. Gemini Capital Fund Management has the most pairs, but accounts for only 
9,1 percent of all the pairs. There are six VCFs that have over 38 co-investment pairs.
7.3. Reliability and Validity Anal ysis
A basic goal of this study is to provide theoretical explanations for the diversification and 
syndication behavior of venture capital firms. This requires the research process, that is the 
development of hypotheses and subsequent testing, to be both valid and reliable. Validity 
refers to the relationship between a concept and its indicators. Reliability, on the other hand, 
refers to the correctness of the construct measurement125.
The data from venture capital firms consists of only the members of the venture capital 
associations. However, this should not threaten the reliability of the study, since all major 
players are members of the associations.
In Finland, all the investment preferences were given for each VCF, whereas in Israel the 
investment preferences were given for each fund. This biases the diversification measures of 
the Israeli venture capital firms downwards and can partly explain why Israeli VC funds were 
more industry-focused. If a VCF would have, for example two funds with different investment 
focuses, this would result in the VCF itself being more diversified.
For validity and reliability of the present study, one crucial link is the operationalization of 
constructs. Nunnally argues for measures that have been validated in previous research126. 
How desirable this may be, it is in many occasions infeasible, because such constructs do not 
exist.
Chapter 7 Results and Discussion 98
125 Carmines, E. & Zeller, J. 1979. Reliability and validity. Sage, Newbury Park.
126 Nunnally, J. 1967. Psychometric theory. McGraw Hill, New York.
The data of actual investment received from the venture capital associations did not include 
the amount of capital invested in a given portfolio company. In order to receive the 
information on the capital invested in different industries and venture stages, the questionnaire 
was sent to VCFs. Because the sample sizes were small to begin with, the number of replies 
was not sufficient to do statistical analyses. Hence, I was forced to use operational measures, 
which give an equal weight to every investment. However, the replies allow me to test the 
validity of the operational measures.
Table 22 shows the correlation coefficient, adjusted R-square between the used operational 
variable and the aimed financial variable. The operational and financial measures are taken 
from the 15 Finnish VCFs’ replies. The results show that all of the operational measures of 
actual investments are highly correlated with the corresponding financial measures. These 
results support my method of giving equal weight to each portfolio investment.
However, stage index, which was based of the preferred stages stated by the VCFs, was used 
along with the other actual investment variables in the analyses. The reason for this was that 
the actual portfolio investment data did not give the stage of the portfolio company. I could 
have formed a construct based on sales and the number of employees in the portfolio company 
to proxy the stages of the Finnish portfolio companies. I chose not to do this, because I could 
not have been able to form a similar construct for the Israeli sample. Using stage index based 
on preferences for both sample countries ensured comparability between the samples. Using 
preferred stage index, in stead of actual stage index, is questionable when we see that the 
correlation between the preferred stage index and the financial stage index is considerably 
low. Hence, the results regarding venture stage index must be interpreted with caution.
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Table 22 Results of validity tests of the operational constructs used in the study
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Table 23 shows the explanation power of the preferred strategies on the actual investment 
behavior. The investment preferences correlate only partially with the actual investment data. 
This suggests that VCFs have thus far only partially been able to realize their intended 
strategies.
Table 23 Degree of realization of the intended strategies
Used variable More precise variable correlation Adjusted RA2
coefficient
Preferred industry ЩЛ Financial industry HHI -,567* ,270
diversification sig.




























diversification for the sig. ,006
Israeli venture capital
funds
In cross-country studies, the problem of comparison emerges, because the selected samples 
might differ in important dimensions. The general characteristics of the two samples were 
compared using the non-parametric median test with Yates’ continuity correction for two 
independent samples. Indeed, the results from these statistical tests suggested that the samples
differ in several dimensions. These differences were then used as possible explanations for the 
differences found in correlation analyses. After all, to study the differences relating to 
technology and government related money, was one of the objectives of this study.
The low number of cases and the relatively large number of missing data might have reduced 
the reliability of the results. However, this risk has been substantially reduced by excluding 
cases with missing values.
The variables, which measured of the degree of diversification relating to venture stage and 
industry were based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. This index does not take into 
account the covariance between the variables - for example the covariance between 
communication and biotechnology industries. As discussed earlier this covariance term is the 
dominant factor of portfolio risk management. A better construct might have been based on 
industry betas. Obtaining industry betas for small firms is likely to be difficult.
In conclusion, the reliability and validity of the results of the study can be judged satisfactory. 
Hence, generalization should be possible at least small technology based counties with 
relatively small venture capital markets.
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Venture stages used by Sapienza were coded as follows: l=seed;2=start-up;3=first stage;4=re-start- 
up; 5 =expansion;6=bridge/aquisition.
8. Discussion of the results and presentation of the Final 
Model
8.1.Summary of the Test Results of the Hypotheses
The exploration of the model that was proposed in chapter 5, produced only partial support for 
the hypotheses. Table 24 summarizes the hypotheses and the results from the empirical 
exploration. Below the table, Figure 39 and Figure 40 separately present the final models for 
the two sample countries. A dashed line represents partial support for the hypothesis.
Table 24 Summary of the test of Hypothesis





HI a: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a more diverse set of industries than 
will other venture capital firms.
Support
HIb: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a less diverse set of industries than will 
other venture capital firms.
Support
H2b: The venture capitalist’s strategy to specialize in order to enhance
their position in networks and information sharing flows will lead them to 
concentrate in one financing stage or several financing stages which may be 
related by virtue of subsequent follow-on investments.
weak support Support
H3a: Venture capital firms that invest mainly in early stage ventures will
prefer investment opportunities within a narrower geographic scope than will 
other venture capital firms.
No support on VCF level 
but support for the 
hypothesis on investment 
level
No support
H3b: Venture capital firms that invest within a less diverse set of
industries will look for investment opportunities within a broader geographic 
scope than will other venture capital firms.
Support Support
H4a: Venture Capital firm with a larger pool of capital under
management will prefer venture investments within a more diverse set of 
industries than will other venture capital firms.
Support weak support
H4b: Venture Capital firm with a larger pool of capital under
management will prefer venture investments within a broader geographic 
scope than will other venture capital firms.
Support Support
H5a: Venture capital firm with public sources of funds will prefer less
diverse set of industries - focusing on high-tech industries - than will other 
venture capital firms.
Support Not tested
H5b: Venture capital firm with public sources of funds will prefer more
early stage ventures than will other venture capital firms.
Support Not tested
H6a venture capital firms with more resources of capital have a lower
propensity to syndicate than those venture capital firms with smaller capital 
resources do.
No support No support
H6b venture capital firms with better availability of prospective
investments have a lower propensity to syndicate
Not tested Not tested
H7a venture capital firms within a more concentrated group, measured
by capital invested, have a higher propensity to invest among themselves
Support Support
H7b venture capital firms located in Helsinki/Tel Aviv have a higher
degree of propensity to invest among themselves
Support No support
H8a: venture capital firms focusing on early stage companies have a No support on VCF level No support
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higher propensity to syndicate than those venture capital firms investing in 
more mature ventures do
but support in other 
direction on investment 
level
H8b: venture capital firms focusing on high-tech companies have a
higher propensity to syndicate than those venture capital firms investing in 
low-tech ventures do
Support Support
H9: Sharing information is the most important reason for venture
capital firms to syndicate
No support Not tested
m
Gt Capital Information
scope "" H4b resources sharing
ть..-у
Figure 39 Final model for the Finnish venture capital industry
Figure 40 Final model for the Israeli venture capital industry
8.2. Key Findings of the Research
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Five aspects of the results are remarkable. First, the Finnish VCFs investing in late stage 
ventures tend to be less industry diversified than those focusing on early stage. In Israel the 
opposite is true - Israeli VCFs investing in late stage ventures tend to be more industry 
diversified than those focusing on early stage. The Finnish result is in line with the portfolio 
theory’s diversification hypothesis, whereas the Israeli result supports the specialization 
hypothesis. The most probable reasons for this distinctive difference relates to the difference 
in the level of high-tech ventures between the sample countries. The result suggests that the 
cost of gaining knowledge in high-tech industries is likely to be higher than in low-tech 
industries. Another interesting explanation relates to post-investment activities. It would seem 
that the Finnish VCFs focusing on early stage believe that they are not able to add sufficiently 
value to their portfolio companies, to compensate the additional risk associated with the early 
stage investment.
The second remarkable finding relates to the relationships between the industry, venture stage, 
and geographic diversification. First, the preferred geographic scope was found to be 
negatively related to the industry diversification in both countries. Second, the preferred 
geographic scope was found to be negatively related to the preferred venture stage 
diversification in Israel. Hence, industry and venture stage diversification seem to be 
substitutes for geographic scope. These relationships can be explained by the portfolio theory 
as well as by the VCF’s need to find a sufficient amount of prospective ventures.
The third remarkable aspect is the relationship between uncertainty relating to venture stage 
and technology, and the propensity to syndicate. In Finland, regression analysis showed that 
late stage implied higher propensity to syndicate. Also, the Israeli data suggested a similar 
relationship, although the relationship was not significant. These results suggest that the 
additional risk associated with the large size of late stage investments more than offsets the 
risk associated with early stage investments. However, high-tech investment increased the 
propensity to syndicate even though the average investment size is less than in low-tech 
ventures. Both of these results can be explained by the portfolio theory and give support to the 
exchange resource model, which suggests that uncertainty should increase the degree of co­
investing, other things equal.
The most important finding of this research relates to the quantitative and qualitative results of 
the link between diversification and syndication. The empirical results from the actual
investment data suggest that industry diversification, and venture stage diversification 
increase the propensity of syndication in both sample countries. Furthermore, the empirical 
results show that a broader geographic scope increases the propensity of syndication in 
Finland. Still, the empirical results give strong evidence that the number of portfolio 
companies is positively related to the propensity to syndicate in Israel.
The replies to the questionnaire further validate the empirical results between diversification 
and syndication. Israeli venture capitalists replies are highly consistent with the empirical 
results. They state that syndication is primarily used to diversify across companies, venture 
stages, industries, and geographic location, in this order. The first three reasons received 
empirical support. For the Finnish sample, the empirical results and venture capitalists replies 
are not as consistent. The Finnish venture capitalists state that syndication is primarily used to 
diversify across companies, geographic location, venture stages, and industries, in this order. 
The last three reasons receive empirical support, but the number of portfolio companies was 
not found to affect the propensity of syndication significantly.
In summary the results suggest that VCFs’ desire to diversify their portfolios drives 
syndication. Because syndication enables VCFs to diversify their portfolios, those VCFs 
wanting to diversify are likely to increase their level of syndication. As a result of the higher 
propensity to syndicate these VCFs become well-diversified. Because the degree of 
diversification is a measure from a certain point in time, but the syndications have emerged 
during a long period of time, it is impossible, based on the empirical results, to say whether 
VCFs that have well-diversified portfolios still have a higher propensity to syndicate. The 
result only tell us that those VCFs that have had a higher propensity to syndicate also have 
become diversified. The relationships between syndication and diversification are presented in 
a figure shown in Appendix 5.
The fifth and final remarkable result relates to public funds. Public funds in Finland seemed to 
behave as expected. Public VCFs tend to invest in early high-tech ventures. Public VCFs were 
also found to be more locally oriented than private VCFs. Because public VCFs may have 
additional investment criteria to the risk-return criteria used by private VCFs, public venture 
capital may result in overvaluing early high-tech companies. This possible overvaluing is 
likely to lead private VCFs to invest in late low-tech firms, where the risk-adj usted return is 
higher. On the other hand, private venture capitalists may simply prefer later stage ventures 
because of their familiarity with financial issues.
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8.3. Other Findings of the Research
The circular model of diversification received support in Finland, except for the unexpected 
relationship between the venture stage and the industry diversification discussed above. In 
Israel, all correlation coefficients were in the expected directions, except for the relationship 
between the venture stage index and the preferred geographic scope. However, one should 
remember that the latter relationship was insignificant also in Finland at the VCF level, but a 
statistically significant positive relationship was found between the number of employees in 
the portfolio company, and the portfolio company’s proximity to the VCF’s office. This result 
suggests that early stage ventures tend to be closer to the VCFs office than late stage ventures, 
as hypothesized. The most apparent reason for this is that early stage ventures require more 
face-to-face assistance, which makes proximity desirable. Unfortunately I was unable to test 
this hypothesis at the investment level in Israel.
The results relating to the uncertainty and syndication were discussed above. Concentration 
would also seem to affect the level of syndication. In both countries VCFs, which had 
invested large amounts of capital, preferred to со-invest among themselves and also had a 
higher overall propensity to syndicate. Moreover, the concentration of VCFs’ offices in the 
Helsinki area seemed to affect syndication patterns in Finland.
The results relating to munificence were contradictory. Empirical results suggested that 
capital resources were, contrary to expectations, positively related to the propensity to 
syndicate in Israel. I was unable to empirically test how the munificence of deal flow affects 
the propensity of syndication. On the other hand, the replies to the questionnaire gave strong 
support in favor of the resource exchange model. The VCFs in both sample countries stated 
that capital limitation were the primary financial reason for them to syndicate. In addition, 
sharing deal flow ranked as second in Finland, and third in Israel in order of importance 
regarding information sharing. In conclusion, due to the problems of forming valid constructs 
to measure the scarcity of capital resources empirically, I will interpret these results as in 
favor of the munificence hypothesis. Thus, all three variables of the resource exchange model 
- munificence, uncertainty, and concentration - received variable degrees of support. In 
conclusion, the results suggests that the resource exchange model seems to be an appropriate 
model in explaining syndication patterns.
Israeli VCFs have a substantially higher propensity to syndicate and connectedness than their 
Finnish counter-partners. The most apparent explanation why the overall connectedness
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differs between the sample countries relates to the technology intensity of the venture capital 
industries and to the size of the countries. First, high technology was found to increase the 
likelihood of syndication. Second, as discussed, proximity seems to affect connectedness. For 
example, Bygrave found that the venture capitalists in California had a greater propensity to 
invest among themselves than with out-of-state venture capitalists. Third, the results show that 
Israeli VCFs focusing on early stage ventures syndicate often with VCFs that specialize in late 
stages. This finding suggests that the dynamics of round financing is likely to take place in 
Israel. It follows, that because Israel has relatively more early high-tech investment and it is 
geographically smaller than Finland, Israel also has a higher overall propensity to syndicate.
Finally, the amount of capital under management was positively related to industry 
diversification and geographic scope. Moreover, the actual industry diversification had a 
stronger correlation with the amount of capital under management than the preferred industry 
diversification. This phenomenon can be explained by the VCF’s need to receive a sufficient 
amount of deal flow. A VCF may be tempted to invest in outside of its original investment 
scope, if the capital available for investments is too high in relation to the deal flow available 
from its original investment scope.
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9. Conclusions
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Previous research has illustrated that high uncertainty and the rather long time horizon of 
venture capital investments makes managing financial risk crucial for venture capital firms’ 
performance127. Finance theory suggests that portfolio diversification should be especially 
beneficial for venture capital firms operating in such an uncertain environment, yet many 
venture capital firms hold poorly diversified portfolios. Moreover, although co-investments 
are common practice among different venture capital firms, little research has been conducted 
on them.
Previous research has studied venture capital firms’ diversification characteristics and how the 
uncertainty related to early venture stage, industry, and technology affect the venture capital 
firms’ propensity to syndicate. However, a related issue of if and how diversification affects 
syndication has not been studied.
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, to analyze the extent to which Finnish and Israeli 
venture capital firms diversify their portfolios, and to identify the most important factors, 
which affect the degree of diversification. Second, to measure the extent of syndication among 
Finnish and Israeli venture capital firms, and to identify the most important reasons for the 
existence of syndication. The most important contribution of this study relates to the 
evaluation of how diversification and syndication are interrelated.
I formed the circular model of diversification and its hypotheses on the basis of previous 
research from US venture capital industry. I used both VCFs investment preferences and data 
from actual portfolio investments to test the hypotheses. To study the degree of syndication, I 
formed variables based on the resource exchange model of Pfeffer128. The empirical part of the 
thesis consisted of analyzing the correlation, chi-square, and regression tests on these 
variables.
9.1. Results
My findings relating to the circular model of diversification were mostly consistent with the 
previous findings from US, except for the negative relationship between the venture stage 
index and the industry diversification in Finland. The most probable reasons for this is the
127 Norton, E, Tenenbaum, B.H. 1993. Specialization versus Diversification as a Venture Capital Investment
Strategy. Journal of Business Venturing, 8. p 432
difference in the level of high-tech ventures between the sample countries. The result suggests 
that the cost of gaining knowledge in high-tech industries is likely to be higher than in low- 
tech industries. Other explanations relate to the lack of Finnish VCFs focusing on early stage 
ventures, and to the lack of capabilities to add value in the portfolio companies.
A new relationship was found between the industry diversification and the geographic scope. 
The results indicate that those VCFs specializing in certain industries would tend to look for 
portfolio companies within a broader geographic scope than those with highly industry- 
diversified portfolios. This relationship was statistically significant in both sample countries. 
In addition, venture stage diversification was found to act as a substitute for the geographic 
scope in Israel. According to a multiple linear regression model, the circular model of 
diversification explained approximately 55 percent of the variance in the actual industry 
diversification in both sample countries.
The exchange resource model appears to explain relatively well syndication patterns. All three 
variables of the resource exchange model - munificence, uncertainty, and concentration - 
received variable degrees of support. First, the uncertainty relating to high-tech ventures 
significantly increased the probability of the investment being syndicated. Second, according 
to the venture capitalists’ replies to my questionnaire, munificence would seem to be the 
primary financial reason for VCFs to syndicate. In addition, sharing deal flow ranked as 
second in Finland and as third in Israel in order of importance regarding information sharing. 
Third, concentration would appear to affect the degree of syndication. For example VCFs, 
which had invested large amounts of capital, preferred to со-invest among themselves, and 
also had a higher overall propensity to syndicate in the both sample countries.
The most important finding of this research relates to the quantitative and qualitative results of 
the link between diversification and syndication. The empirical results from the actual 
investment data suggest that industry diversification, and venture stage diversification 
increase the propensity of syndication in both sample countries. The replies to the 
questionnaire further validate the empirical results between diversification and syndication. In 
summary the results suggest that VCFs’ desire to diversify their portfolios increases the 
propensity to syndicate. As a result of the higher propensity to syndicate VCFs become well-
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diversified. Venture capitalists state that syndication is primarily used to diversify across 
companies, and venture stages.
Finally, public funds in Finland seemed to behave as expected. Public VCFs tend to invest in 
early high-tech ventures. Public VCFs were also found to be more locally oriented than 
private VCFs.
9.2. Previous Research
The initial circular model was mainly formed from previous research. The model received 
strong support. My contributions to this field of study relate to the founding of a negative 
relationship between the industry diversification and the geographic scope. In addition, my 
results suggested that industry diversification and venture stage diversification are more likely 
to be substitutes for geographic scope. These new findings are both in line with the portfolio 
theory.
Bygrave tested the exchange resource model in US and received support. He found that high- 
tech and early stage implied syndication, although the investment sizes were less than in late 
or low-tech ventures. Bygrave went as far as to argue that the primary reason for VCFs to 
syndicate is to share information, not to spread financial risk.129 Interestingly, my findings 
indicated that late stage and high-technology implied syndication in Finland, and similar 
results were found in Israel. All of these results can be explained with the portfolio theory. 
This point was ignored in Bygrave (1987). I used a questionnaire to contribute to the debate of 
the dominant factor for syndication. The results from the questionnaire suggest that spreading 
of financial risk is an equally important factor as sharing of information.
9.3. Implica tions
Implications for the Finnish Venture Capital Firms
Finnish VCFs industry is at the moment quite concentrated in terms of their preferences 
regarding industry diversification and the venture stage index. 73 percent of the Finnish VCFs 
have no industry preferences and 80 percent are concentrating on rather late stages. The 
corresponding percents from Israel are only 23 and 55. Moreover, the share of capital invested 
in high-tech industries in Israel is three times that in Finland. Hence, I would expect that in
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Business Venturing, volume 2. p 151
the future there will be more Finnish VCFs specializing in certain industries, especially high- 
tech industries, and in early stage ventures. There certainly would seem to be room in the 
industry for such VCFs. More restricted investment strategies would also help institutional 
investors, such as pension fund managers, to diversify their own portfolios. When VCFs have 
well-stated and distinct investment strategies, institutional investors can manage risk better.
In addition, the level of connectedness in Finland is significantly less than that in US or in 
Israel. This is likely to be due to the lower level of early high-tech investments in Finland. 
Although syndication enables a VCF to diversify its portfolio, it may make portfolio 
diversification more difficult for an institutional investor. An institutional investor may 
believe he has diversified his venture capital funds by investing in several different funds. If 
these funds syndicate often the end result may be that the institutional investor winds up 
having his money in the same portfolio companies. It follows that from institutional investors’ 
point of view, a more desirable reason for the existence of syndication is likely to be the 
sharing of information. According to the questionnaire Israeli venture capitalists appreciated 
the information sharing relatively more than their Finnish counter-partners. It follows, that the 
Finnish VCFs are advised to search for syndications that not only spread financial risk, but 
also share information.
Information sharing is also likely to enhance the VCFs’ potential to add value. First, venture 
capitalists believe that syndication helps them build a network. This network may bring 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs together more efficiently than what otherwise would 
happen. Second, at least venture capitalists tend to believe that two investors from different 
VCFs can make superior investment decisions. Finally, syndication may help combining 
different competencies from different VCFs to provide a portfolio company with non- 
financial assistance that improve the risk-return mix of the portfolio.
Implications for Institutional Investors
While syndication itself is likely to benefit institutional investors, syndications among the 
funds in which a given institutional investor has invested are problematic from the 
institutional investors’ point of view. Because syndication may make risk management more 
difficult for institutional investors, they should try to limit the probability of having their 
money being invested in the same portfolio companies by different funds they have invested 
in. Institutional investors are advised to invest in funds that not only have transparent 
investment policy regarding diversification but also have transparent policy regarding
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syndications. If the information on the funds’ syndication patterns is not available, 
institutional investor could limit the probability of undesired syndications by investing in 
funds in different groups that have a low degree of intergroup syndication. For example, in 
Finland venture stage seemed to divide the VCFs into two groups that preferred to syndicate 
intragroup, that is among other VCFs in their group. By investing in one fund in each group 
the institutional investor would increase the likelihood of having his money being invested in 
different ventures.
The amount of capital under management was found to be positively related to industry 
diversification and geographic scope. A VCF may be tempted to invest in companies outside 
of its original investment scope, if the capital available for investments is high in relation to 
the deal flow available from its original investment scope. Institutional investors are advised 
to evaluate the availability of the deal flow in the fund’s investment scope before they decide 
the amount of money they want to invest in the fund. Too much money in relation to the deal 
flow is likely to result in portfolio investments outside the intended investment scope.
9.4. Limitations
One weakness in this study arises from the lack of VCFs in Finland and in Israel. Although 
the response rate to my questionnaire itself was considerably high, the absolute number of 
replies forced me to use operational variables, which give equal weights to every investment, 
instead of financial measures. Correlation analysis fortunately revealed that operational 
measures were highly valid to explain financial measures. The obtained results are thus based 
on operational variables, and may to some extent be biased.
The variables, which measured of the degree of industry-diversification was based on the 
Herfmdahl-Hirschman index, which does not take into account the systematic risk of the 
industries. A better construct might have been based on industry betas.
9.5. Suggestions for Further Study
Many venture capital firms tend to specialize in certain industry or venture stage. A 
specialization strategy implies that these venture capital firms believe they are able to add 
value in their portfolio companies. Is this belief true?
As we know, many mutual funds also specialize and believe they can pick under-priced stocks 
and forecast the future market trend. However, the empirical evidence suggests stock markets 
are so efficient that investors would be better off if they would invest their money in index
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funds with low costs. Does the same apply to the venture capital market? Can specialized 
funds add sufficient amount of value in order to beat the well-diversified portfolios? It would 
be interesting to know whether the risk adjusted returns from specialized venture capital funds 
have over-performed the diversified funds or not.
Syndication is a common practice in the venture capital industry. More research attention 
should be given to it. The critical question remains, whether the dominant factor in 
syndication is the spreading of financial risk or the sharing of information.
This research focused on the VCFs and institutional investors’ point of view on syndication. 
Research on what the benefits of syndication are to each party involved - the entrepreneur, the 
VCF, and the institutional investor - deserves more emphasis. It would be interesting to know 
if and how VCFs’ syndication and diversification strategies relate to their post-investment 
activities.
All previous researches on syndication have ignored the actual size of the portfolio 
investments. A more detailed analysis on the risk associated with the investment size, venture 
stage and high-tech is needed in order to separate their relative importance to syndication.
Finally, this study was unable to empirically test the effect of munificence on syndication, and 
further research is needed on the topic. Both the sharing of deal flow and capital constraints 
ranked high in the venture capitalists’ replies, which suggests that munificence appears to be 
the most important factor of the resource exchange model affecting syndication. A 
longitudinal study is required to more reliably measure if and how capital resources determine 
the degree of syndication. Similarly, the question of how the flow of prospective deals affects 
the level of syndication, requires further attention.*
Studying how and why venture capital firms diversify and со-invest is likely to bring more 
light to financial risk management. After all, because venture capital involves high
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* Aside from the further exploration of the results, the data collected for the present study also seem suitable for 
other analyses. One potential further investigation road might be an analysis of the relationship between the 
intended investment strategies and the actual investment behavior of venture capital firms.
uncertainty, asymmetries of information, and outstanding opportunities of return, it gives us 
an opportunity to study modem financial theory in a setting of extremes 13°.
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Appendix 1
All of the questions in this questionnaire are related to your current portfolio companies. 
Those companies you have exited from should be excluded
Total number of syndicated investments where the lead investor #
Approximately the number of first round syndications #
Approximately the number of later round syndications #
Approximately the number of syndication proposals you have received #
Approximately the number of investment proposals per one investment #
Number of syndications among different funds within your management company #
Number of syndications with foreign venture capital firms #
Total amount of syndicated investments FIM millions
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AND MARK YOUR 
AGREEMENT (1 to 5)
1 = does not affect 
our decision to 
syndicate
WE SYNDICATE WITH OTHER VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS (VCFs) BECAUSE...
syndication allows us to participate in larger deals (e.g. fund limits, minority holding 
rule..)
syndication enables us to obtain future deal flow from the syndicated partners 
syndication enables us to invest in greater number of different industries 
syndication enables us to invest in a greater number of different venture stages
syndication enables us to invest in companies within a broader geographic scope 
'sÿhaicâtïônTsa'meân's"tô'rëïïucë'cômpâhy'spe'cïfTc''nsR'becâ'ü'sé'ïtaflôwsTjs'fôTnvesf 
in greater number of companies
syndication helps us building industry specific networks and contacts
two venture capitalists from different VCFs can make a better investment decision
than just one
we want to be part of the success stories and therefore make later round syndicated 
investments in well performing companies
amount of work needed to evaluate the proposal and to assist the company 
personally.
"sÿhdi'câiïôn'h'âsp'übïïc'fëïâtïô'nsvâiüë'b'ë'câ'üsëvvë'wâhtouf'compâhÿ'nârnetô^e......
attached to as many deals as possible 
Other.....
5 = I strongly 
agree
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
FUTURE TREND OF SYNDICATION
Do you see that the proportional amount of syndication (=number of syndicated 
investment divided by the total number of investments) in your company is going to 
decrease or increase in the future, and with what types of VCFs (range:+2 - -2, where
+2 indicates strong increase in syndication; +1= slight increase; 0= current level; -1 Finnish Foreign
slight decrease, and -2 strong decrease in syndication) VCFs VCFs
number of syndications with larger venture capitalists 
(measured by capital under management) +2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
number of syndications with similar size venture capitalist 
(measured by capital under management) +2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
number of syndications with smaller venture capitalists 
(measured by capital under management) +2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
number of syndications with venture capitalists with different industry focus +2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
number of syndications with venture capitalists with similar industry focus +2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
number of syndications with venture capitalists with different venture stage focus +2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
number of syndications with venture capitalists with similar venture stage focus +2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
We do not syndicate because....
Appendix 1
All of the questions in this questionnaire are related to your current portfolio companies. 
Those companies you have exited from should be excluded
Name of the management company
Capital under management FIM millions
Capital invested FIM millions
Number of years the management company has been in venture capital business #
Number of people currently responsible for monitoring portfolio investments #
Number of portfolio investments for which typical individual is currently responsible #
Number of boards of directors on which typical individual serves #
Number of portfolio companies altogether #
Number of portfolio companies and approximately the percentage of capital invested 
in the following venture stages









Number of portfolio companies and approximately the percentage of capital invested 
in the following industries











Industrial automation and control
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